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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a study of South African transitions.  A transition, within the 
context of South African contemporary history, usually refers to the period in 
the early 1990s when South Africa underwent a negotiated transition from 
racial minority rule to a full democracy in 1994.  This thesis takes a liberal 
understanding of South Africa’s transition timeline and is not confined just to 
South Africa’s political transition, but also examines transitions within 
transitions.  This will be done through three studies beginning with a survey of 
the global political transitions that took place against the backdrop of South 
Africa’s domestic political transition in the early 1990s. Secondly, we will look 
at the role that national historical identity plays in diplomacy and international 
relations and, more specifically, at the cultivation of a new historic identity in 
South Africa’s international relations.  Lastly, we will examine the policy 
transitions that came in the “new” South Africa through a case study of the 
nationalization debate.  All three of these focuses will be studied through the 
lens of South Africa’s foreign relations with China and the United States which 
provides a unique vantage point for viewing the complexities. The goal of this 
thesis is to develop a broader understanding of transitions in South Africa and 
the role that the United States and China played in them.  As this theme is 
interrogated, some of the continuities and discontinuities will be exposed 
between the “old” and “new” South Africa. 
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OPSOMMING 
Hierdie tesis bestudeer Suid-Afrikaanse transisies. 'n Transisie, binne die 
konteks van kontemporêre Suid-Afrikaanse geskiedenis, verwys gewoonlik na 
die tydperk van die vroeë 1990's toe Suid-Afrika 'n bemiddelde oorgang 
ondergaan het vanaf radikale minderheidsbewind na 'n volledige demokrasie 
in 1994.  Hierdie tesis neem 'n liberale benadering tot die tydperk waarbinne 
hier periode beskou word en is nie beperk tot slegs Suid-Afrika se politieke 
transisie nie, maar ondersoek ook transisies binne-in transisies.  Dit sal 
gedoen word deur drie ondersoeke, wat begin met 'n oorsig van die 
wêreldwye politieke transisies wat op daardie stadium plaasgevind het teen 
die agtergrond van Suid-Afrika se binnelandse politieke transisie van die 
1990's.  Tweedens sal ons kyk na die rol wat nasionale historiese identiteit 
speel in diplomatiese en internasionale verhoudinge en, meer spesifiek, die 
kultivering van 'n nuwe nasionale historiese identiteit in Suid-Afrika se 
internasionale verhoudinge.  Laastens beskou ons die beleidstransisies wat 
ingekom het in die "nuwe" Suid-Afrika.  Dit word gedoen deur 'n gevallestudie 
van Suid-Afrika se debat oor nasionalisering.  Al drie hierdie fokusse sal 
beskou word deur die lens van Suid-Afrika se verhoudinge met Sjina en die 
Verenigde State.  Hierdie verhoudinge verskaf 'n unieke oogpunt waar 
rondom die kompleksiteite van hierdie debat beskou kan word.  Die doel van 
hierdie tesis is om 'n breër verstandhouding te skep waarin Suid-Afrika se 
transisies beskou kan word.  Soos hierdie tema ondersoek word, word van die 
kontinuïteite en diskontinuïteite van die "ou" en "nuwe" Suid-Afrika ontbloot. 
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1.1  Introduction 
This thesis is a study of South African transitions.  When we talk of transitions 
within the context of contemporary South African history, we are generally talking about 
the period in the early 1990s when South Africa prepared and underwent a transition 
from racial minority rule to inclusive democracy.  This period culminated in South 
Africa’s first democratic election on April 27, 1994.  This is not to say that South Africa’s 
democratic transition was complete after the election, indeed, South African politicians 
have articulated a broader definition of South Africa’s transition period.  During the June 
2012 African National Congress Policy Congress, a discussion document was released 
entitled “The Second Transition? Building a National Democratic Society and the 
Balance of Forces in 2012”.1  The document, which was supported by President Jacob 
Zuma, essentially expressed that the first eighteen years of South African democracy 
had been a part of the political transition, and that it was time to begin an economic and 
social stage.2 While many have dismissed such statements as political jockeying and 
mere verbiage, it does highlight how some politicians have begun to revise their 
understanding of South Africa’s transition and the transition timeline.  This sentiment is 
not evident within the African National Congress (ANC) alone.  In May 2012, former 
President, F.W. de Klerk, during an interview said “Fact is that in South Africa, transition 
                                                 
1 The Second Transition: Building a National Democratic Society and Balance of Forces in 2012. N.p: 
African National Congress, June 2012.  Version 7.0 as amended by the Special NEC 27 February 2012 
 
2 The document was rejected by the majority of ANC commissions, and was revised to read “The Second 
Phase of the Transition” See Ltsoalo, Matuma, and Michelle Pieterse. “Zuma’s Second Transition 
Rejected by ANC Commissions.” The M&G Online. N.p., 27 June 2012. Web. 01 Mar. 2013. For further 
reading see Bauer, Nickolaus, ”ANC Accepts Revised ‘second Transition’ Document”  The M&G Online. 
N.p., 28 June 2012 Web. 01 Mar. 2013 
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is taking its time.”3 
This thesis takes a liberal understanding of South Africa’s transition timeline and 
is not confined just to South Africa’s political transition, but also examines transitions 
within transitions. i.e. the transitions that accompanied the domestic political transition.  
This will be done through a focus and study of three transitions beginning with a survey 
of the global political transitions that took place against the backdrop of South Africa’s 
domestic political transition in the early 1990s.  Secondly, we will look at the role that 
national historical identity plays in diplomacy and international relations and, more 
specifically, at the cultivation of a new historic identity in South Africa’s international 
relations.  Lastly, we will examine the policy transitions that came in the ‘New’ South 
Africa through a case study of the nationalization debate. In order to fully study these 
transition themes a broad timeline is necessary, and so we will be looking at events 
ranging from 1990 to 2012.  All three of these focuses will be studied through the lens of 
South Africa’s foreign relations with China4 and the United States. 
 
1.2  Why China and the United States? 
The time period covered in this thesis, from the late early 1990s to 2012 is, as 
already stated, a critical transition period for South Africa, and this also applies to its 
diplomatic relations.  This thesis finds the United States and China to be two of South 
Africa’s most important diplomatic relationships for the late twentieth and early twenty-
                                                 
3 "'Transition Is Taking Its Time' in South Africa, De Klerk Says." Interview by Christiane Amanpour. CNN. 
Cable News Network, 11 Jan. 2012. Web. 01 Mar. 2013. 
<http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/11/world/africa/south-africa-de-klerk>. 
 
4 During this Thesis any mention of “China” refers to the People’s Republic of China.  Taiwan will be the 
title used in any discussions of the Republic of China. 
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first century.  At the time of South Africa’s transition to an ANC-led government, there 
were no official relations with China.  Since the beginning of official diplomatic relations 
in 1998 however, it has come to be a critical partner for South Africa not only in matters 
of trade and commerce, but also with regards to issues of global governance and 
reform.  South Africa’s relations with the United States, on the other hand, have been 
constant since 17995, with the US establishing one of its very first diplomatic posts as a 
new country, in Cape Town.  The differences in a new diplomatic relationship with 
China, and an established one with the US, offer many avenues of exploration for the 
topic of transition.  Furthermore, the United States, for the period in focus, was, and still 
is, considered a world super-power from the West, while China was rapidly becoming 
an emerging power from the East.  These differences in both power, and cultural and 
geographic orientation once again allow unique opportunities for understanding how 
South Africa has balanced and transitioned into new diplomatic relationships.  This 
study is not one of West versus East, as so many studies involving China and the US 
tend to be. For South Africa, because of its history and varied population, defies this 
simple classification system. In answering the present question of why China and the 
United States, it is useful to quote from a pamphlet written by a South African, C.F. 
Andrews, in 1928. In the pamphlet Andrews sought to contextualize the political turmoil 
in China for readers of The Natal Witness. The pamphlet was titled South Africa and the 
Far East: The Chinese Crisis.  After giving an overview of the domestic political crisis 
                                                 
5 The rapid increase in the American shipping industry lead to the appointment of the first U.S. 
government representative: Consul John Elmslie, Jr. to the Cape, making it one of the earliest consular 
representations established by the young nation.  See Rosenthal, Eric. Stars and Stripes in Africa; Being 
a History of American Achievements in Africa by Explorers, Missionaries, Pirates, Adventurers, Hunters, 
Miners, Merchants, Scientists, Soldiers, Showmen, Engineers, and Others with Some Account of Africans 
Who Have Played a Part in American Affairs with a Foreword to the First Edition by General the Right 
Honorable Jan Christian Smuts, P.C. Cape Town: National, 1968. 29. Print. 
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besieging China, Andrews concludes by giving an opinion on South Africa’s place in the 
world that is instructive for our study as well. 
South Africa herself belongs also by right to the West. It was from the 
West that her first settlers came.  It was to the West that their descendants 
always looked for support.  The West gave the splendid physique, 
education and enterprise which have largely made South Africa what it is.  
In character, South Africa to-day is one of the younger nations of the 
world, fresh and virile, having just attained her western nationhood.  But 
that is not the whole picture.  She has also to learn, in the days to come, 
her own larger international outlook. By doing so, the people of this 
country must look eastward as well as westward. She is the half-way 
house on the map of the globe between East and West.6 
 
Some contemporary readers would no doubt find fault with Andrew’s Western 
classification of South Africa, but his thoughts must be contextualized for the period in 
which he wrote them.  The South African government of the period had a definite 
Eurocentric identity. While the South Africa of today is decidedly more African in its 
identity, it is still geographically the halfway point between East and West.  Andrews 
advises that South Africa pursue a flexible international relations policy by looking 
“eastward as well as westward”.  In the parlance of contemporary international relations 
theory, Andrews is advocating that South Africa be a ‘pivot state’ which is flexible in the 
international system and not bound to any great power.  Has contemporary South Africa 
managed to “look eastward as well as westward”?  Further, what possible influences 
have occurred in South Africa when looking to the east and west, i.e., China and the 
United States?  These are just a few of the questions to be explored. This study, 
however, is not meant to be an exact comparative analysis of South Africa’s relations 
with China and the United States.  The goal is to locate the role or position that China 
and the United States have played in our transition themes. 
                                                 
6 Andrews, C. F. South Africa and the Far East: The Chinese Crisis. Natal: Natal Witness, 1928. Print. 
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In summary, this thesis uses a study of South African foreign relations with China and 
the United States as a lens to focus on our study theme of “Transitions”.  Through this 
approach, we hope to be able to gain a unique perspective on these transitions and the 
“half-way house on the map”. 
 
1.3  Research Aims 
Broadly speaking, the research aims of this work are on two interconnected 
themes: transitions, and South Africa’s evolving position in the world.  This thesis 
approaches these two themes through an historical analysis of key events, people, and 
documents.  By doing so we will hopefully better be able to answer one of the guiding 
questions of this study, ‘Where in the world is South Africa?’.  One other guiding 
question of this thesis is an interrogation of just how ‘New’ the ‘New South Africa’ is.  
That is to say, what are the continuities and discontinuities of the ‘Old’ and ‘New’ South 
Africa, particularly regarding its foreign relations.  As we will see in the literature review, 
some research already exists on, or in relation to, these questions.  This thesis aims not 
only to build upon this existing research but seeks also to unify it. 
 
Finally, this thesis aims to follow the ‘inside/outside’ reading of history that was 
advocated in the work of English historian R. G. Collingwood.  In 1946, Collingwood 
published a book entitled The Idea of History, in which he outlined a categorical 
approach to studying history.  Collingwood asserts that the historian must make the 
distinction between the “inside” and “outside” of events.  Collingwood explains this 
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distinction in the following paragraph, which is highly instructive to the broad aim of this 
thesis and is worth quoting at length. 
By the outside of the event I mean everything belonging to it which can be 
described in terms of bodies and their movements.  He [the historian] is 
investigating not mere events (where by a mere event I mean one which 
has only an outside and no inside) but actions, and an action is the unity 
of the outside and inside of an event. His work may begin by discovering 
the outside of an event, but it can never end there; he must always 
remember that the event was an action, and that his main task is to think 
himself into this action, to discern the thought of its agent.7 
 
Collingwood’s description of events as having an inside and outside makes the 
distinction between the observation of actions and the thought of the persons or agents 
that were involved in the actions.  Collingwood explains that in doing history “the object 
to be discovered is not the mere event but the thought expressed in it.”8 What does this 
distinction mean for our research purposes?  While this thesis necessarily contains 
descriptions and facts regarding historical events as a foundation, the goal is to go 
beyond a mere photograph of South Africa’s transition.  To do this, we will be looking at 
the historical forces that underpinned and shaped these events, thereby unifying 
thoughts and actions, or the “outside” and “inside” of history. 
 
1.4  Research Methodology 
1.4.1  Sources 
This thesis will make use of a variety of sources, both primary and secondary.  
These sources will include journal articles, scholarly literature, news sources such as 
                                                 
7 Collingwood, R. G., and T. M. Knox. The Idea of History,. Oxford: Clarendon, 1946. 213. Print. 
 
8 Ibid, 213. 
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newspapers, magazines, periodicals, government publications, and speeches.  This 
thesis will, at times, blur the usually rigid lines between primary and secondary sources 
and argue that some secondary sources have, with the passage of time, become 
primary sources in that they have come to represent an historic period.  Examples of 
this blurring include Francis Fukuyama’s 1992 book, The End of History and the Last 
Man, and Samuel P. Huntington’s influential 1993 article, The Clash of Civilizations?  
Works such as these are valuable not only for the arguments proffered, but also as 
works that shed light onto the leading thoughts of the period.  These works have 
become blurred in their classification as primary or secondary sources and they have 
also become examples of leading voices.  That is to say, they embody in their own 
writing a distinct voice of the historical time period in which they were written, and not 
only do they embody this historical voice, they have either become or were a leading 
voice of the period when they wrote.  This will be a valuable addition that will offset one 
of the limitations of this thesis. 
 
1.4.2 Discourse Analysis 
One of the limitations of this thesis is access to classic manuscript primary 
sources. Since the study is primarily one of government actions and government 
relations, there is only so much material available for public research and analysis.  This 
presents a problem for research into the “inside” of events.  While it is much easier to 
observe and analyse the “outside” of events, especially for those who are not on the 
inside of these “inside” events, a useful method that enables a certain level of 
penetration is discourse analysis.  This thesis makes use of this method, and this 
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section will briefly outline the method as it relates to our work, as well as to the uses of 
the method. 
Discourse analysis is a broad term for several different approaches for analysing 
written, oral and other forms of communication.  Throughout this thesis, discourse will 
be understood simply as the conversation, or communications between governments 
and the public, or government to government communications.9 Paul Chilton, in his 
work on analysing political discourse, notes that political activity could not exist without 
the use of language, and that even when language is being employed as a cloaking 
mechanism, that in itself is a form of communication.10 Discourse analysis is often 
conducted at the cellular level, i.e., a linguistic analysis; however, our analysis will be 
confined to the content of the discourse or to the statements of the actors in our study.  
The main resources to be consulted for this analysis will be speeches and published 
government documents. 
 
1.5  Limitations of the Study 
We have already touched on one of the limitations of this study, namely a lack of 
access to research materials.  During the course of research this author contacted 
many past and present government officials of the South African government.  While a 
few were willing to be interviewed on questions regarding this thesis, the vast majority 
were opposed.  Therefore a close reading of published statements became critical to 
accomplishing the research aims. 
                                                 
9 Due to space and time constraints, we will not enter into the linguistic debates on defining discourse and 
the origins of discourse.  See Wodak, Ruth, and Michael Meyer, eds. Methods of Critical Discourse 
Analysis. Second ed. London: Sage, 2010. Print.  
 
10 Chilton, Paul A. Analysing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice. London: Routledge, 2004. 6. Print.  




The scope of this thesis is wide ranging, dealing with a time period of over twenty 
years, and the diplomatic relations of three countries. The complexities of South Africa’s 
relations with both the United States and China mean there are many tempting rabbit 
trails to go down. This scope and the ensuing complexities represents a limitation in that 
there is simply not enough time to deal with all the intricacies of each relationship. 
 
While this study examines South Africa’s relations with the United States and 
China, it is not meant to be a comparative study, though comparisons will at certain 
points naturally arise.  The purpose is to highlight different aspects and nuances of our 
three transition themes through a study of South Africa’s international relations. 
 
1.6  Middle Power Theory 
The title of this thesis, Studies on Transition—South Africa’ Foreign Relations 
with the United States and China, refers to the broad aim of the study in studying and 
locating South Africa’s transitions in the context of its relations with two global powers.  
In terms of power, an admittedly abstract and vague term, South Africa clearly does not 
compare to either China or the United States.  It does not have the material capabilities 
or economic power of these states, but in terms of the international system it is not one 
of the ‘weak’ states.  Does this make South Africa a middle power?  Since the demise of 
the bipolar international system at the conclusion of the Cold War, many states have 
had to re-evaluate their power status in the world.  This includes South Africa, where a 
salient feature of many post-apartheid foreign policy discussions is the use and 
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prominence of middle power theory.11   As already outlined, this thesis is an historical 
analysis of South Africa’s foreign relations and transition period, however, its author will 
also employ the theory of middle powers and middle-‘powermanship’ from the field of 
International Relations to explore certain aspects of the three transition themes.  The 
purpose of this section is to give a brief outline and definition of middle powers and 
middlepowermanship and also to explain its use in this work.12 
  
The definition of middle power theory, like so many theories and concepts in the 
social sciences, is rather elusive.  The idea of “middle” and “power” are both terms that 
are most easily defined by their context and relationship to their peripheral.  The 
concept of middle powers or medium powers has been present in writings on 
international relations since the time of Thomas Acquinas and usually denoted a state 
that was neither a great nor a small power, based on being able to identify these two 
extremes.  The modern notion of middle powers was revived by Jan Smuts in his 1918 
publication “The League of Nations:  A Practical Suggestion”, however it was Canadian 
diplomats and foreign policy makers in the immediate post-Second World War era who 
popularized the concept amongst international relations practitioners.13 
                                                 
11 Ian Taylor posits that any redirections in foreign policy of the post-apartheid era has been in a direction 
that fits theories of middle powers and middlepowermanship. See Taylor, Ian. Stuck in Middle Gear: 
South Africa’s Post-apartheid Foreign Relations. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001. Print 
 
12 Due to length and focus constraints, this section is not able to provide a full account of middle power 
theory debates.  Andrew Cooper provides an excellent survey of middle power theory, as well as the 
effect the end of the Cold War has had on middle power states.  See Cooper, Andrew Fenton. Niche 
Diplomacy: Middle Powers After the Cold War. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1997. 
Print. 
 
13 Ravenhill, J. 1998. “Cycles of Middle Power Activism: Constraint and Choice in Australian and 
Canadian Foreign Policies.” Australian Journal of International Affairs. Volume 52. Number 3. pp. 309 
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A traditional starting point for defining a middle power has been in assessing the 
material capabilities of a state.  The Gross National Product of a state, for example, may 
be used by those seeking a material definition of middle powers.  Taylor notes that while 
it is important to assess the material capabilities of a state, most assessment methods 
provide little explanation of the power.14  Material assessments of power, however, are 
not able to adequately account for the origins or projections of a state’s power. 
 
In the post-Cold War period, a critical method for examining many middle powers 
has been in examining a state’s international behaviour.  The behavioural model moves 
away from quantifiable characteristics such as GNP towards an analysis of diplomatic 
and international actions.  The behavioural model has been concisely articulated by 
Cooper, Higgott and Nossal who define middle powers by “their tendency to pursue 
multilateral solutions to international problems, their tendency to embrace compromise 
positions in international disputes, and their tendency to embrace notions of ‘good 
international citizenship’ to guide their diplomacy”. 15 Another term for this type of 
behaviour is middlepowermanship, which is a foreign policy style that often shows a 
propensity towards multilateral activity and mediatory diplomacy.  It is important to note 
however, that middle powers are not just middle powers simply because they exhibit 
these tendencies, but that in some cases they may genuinely be pursuing these actions 
in a belief that it serves their states’ best interest.16  This thesis will rely on the 
                                                 
14 Taylor, Ian. “Hegemony, ‘common sense’ and compromise: a neo-gramscian analysis of multilateralism 
in post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign Policy.” D. Phil. University of Stellenbosch, 2000. 70. Print. 
 
15 Quoted in Chapnick, Adam. “The Middle Power.” Canadian Foreign Policy 7.2 (1999): 75. Print.   
 
16 Taylor, Ian. “Hegemony, ‘common sense’ and compromise: a neo-gramscian analysis of multilateralism 
in post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy.” D. Phil. University of Stellenbosch, 2000. 70. Print. 
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behavioural aspect of middle power theory to examine South Africa’s foreign policy 
behaviour and its relations with other states. 
 
 
1.6.1  South Africa as a Middle Power? 
In the previous section, we briefly examined two ways of defining a middle 
power, and now the question arises as to South Africa’s status.  There is no question 
that South Africa is a regional power, or put more bluntly, a local giant.  Its economy is 
more than three times as large as the combined economies of all the members of the 
Southern African Development Community.  In 1993 it produced 27% of the African 
GNP, 41% of sub-Saharan African GNP, and 64% of sub-Equatorial Africa’s GNP.17  On 
top of its economic clout, South Africa’s military is, even after the cutbacks and 
retrogrades of the 1990s, the continent’s most equipped military force.  These 
credentials have even led some to ask whether South Africa really is a “partner” in 
Africa, or is it a hegemon?18  Such a hegemonic relationship would be at odds with most 
middle power criteria, and thus an active debate within many foreign policy circles has 
been whether or not South Africa qualifies as a middle power.19  Despite these seeming 
contradictions, Taylor argues that one must examine not just South Africa’s behaviour 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
17 John Daniel, ‘Southern Africa in the global context: forever in the slow lane?’, South African Journal of 
International Affairs, 4(1), 1996. Print. 
 
18See Ahwireng-Obeng, Fred, and McGowan, Patrick.  “Partner or Hegemon? South Africa in Africa.” 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies 16.1 (1998). Print. 
 
19 See Van Der Westhizen, Janis. “South Africa’s Emergence as a Middle Power.” Third World 
Quarterly19.3 (1998): 435-56. Print. See also Schoeman, Maxi. “South Africa as an Emerging Middle 
Power.” African Security Review 9.3 (200): 47-58. Print.  
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regionally, but place it within the context of the international system.  When given this 
larger setting, South Africa fits the mold of a post-Cold War middle power.20 This thesis 
accepts South Africa to be a middle power within the international system, both in a 
material sense, but more importantly in the way that it behaves.  The author concurs 
with Taylor that middle power theory provides an explanatory framework for post-
apartheid foreign behaviour and policies. Although the present work is not a study of 
South Africa’s middle power status, nor an exact study of South Africa’s middle power 
behaviour and relationship with the United States and China, it will at certain points 
draw upon middle power theory to explain certain actions and aspects of South Africa’s 
foreign policy. 
 
1.7  Literature Review 
The following section is meant to provide an overview of key texts that have 
either informed this thesis or which provide a departure point on which this study seeks 
to build.  The topic of South Africa’s domestic political transition has received a great 
deal of attention with numerous books and articles covering the topic.21  While these 
books are useful in providing context for our study, they fall into the traditional approach 
to studies on transition in South Africa with their narrow focus on the early 1990s.  
                                                 
20 Taylor, Ian. “Hegemony, ‘common sense’ and compromise: a neo-gramscian analysis of multilateralism 
in post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy.” 71. 
 
21 The following list of articles is not exhaustive but represents the variety and volume of work that has 
been given to the negotiation period and the political transition.  See Rantete, J. and Giliomee, H. (1992) 
Transition to democracy through transaction? Bilateral negotiations 
between the ANC and NP in South Africa, African Affairs, 91(365), pp. 515–542.  Friedman, S. (Ed.) 
(1993) The Long Journey: South Africa’s Quest for a Negotiated Settlement (Johannesburg: 
Ravan Press). Sparks, Alistair. (1996) Tomorrow is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa’s 
Negotiated Revolution (London: Mandarin). 
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There are a few studies that have departed from this approach that involve a broader 
study of transition in South Africa.  This includes James Barber’s 2004 book Mandela’s 
World: The International Dimensions of South Africa’s Political Revolution, which 
examines the political transition through the lens of South Africa’s international relations 
and the changes taking place in the international system.  Barber’s work is particularly 
useful in its analysis of Mandela and F.W. de Klerk’s competition for international 
influence during the negotiation period.22  Barber’s book is also joined by Christopher 
Landsberg’s 2004 book The Quite Diplomacy of Liberation:  International Politics and 
South Africa’s Political Transition.  Landsberg, like Barber, takes an international 
relations focus for examining South Africa’s transition and focuses on the diplomatic 
efforts that assisted with bringing about the end of apartheid.  Landsberg’s focus on the 
foreign actors involved in South Africa does not, though, fully take into account the 
additional influence of the international political atmosphere and how this may have 
possibly bolstered some foreign actors.23  Finally, our review of South African texts on 
‘transition’ would be incomplete if we did not include Hein Marais’s South Africa Pushed 
to the Limit: The Political Economy of Change.  Marais provides one of the most 
comprehensive accounts of post-apartheid economic policy and the political forces that 
have shaped those policies.  Marais’s analysis is underpinned by an historical sensitivity 
so that his work charts post 1994 economic developments with a strong grounding in 
the context of National Party economic policies. 
                                                 
22 Barber, James P. Mandela's World: The International Dimension of South Africa's Political Revolution 
1990-99. Oxford: James Currey, 2004. Print. 
 
23 Landsberg, Christopher. The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation International Politics and South Africa's 
Transition. Johannesburg: Jacana, 2004. Print. 
 




The topic of United States South Africa relations has been covered in depth by 
historians, political scientists and sociologists alike, and there are many works that 
serve as excellent stepping stones to our study aims.  Chapter Two will begin with a 
brief survey of the Cold War’s impact on South Africa. This topic in itself is monolithic 
and the purpose is to simply establish that the Cold War had an indelible impact on the 
apartheid regime and its foreign relations. Thomas Borstelmann’s 1993 book 
Apartheid’s Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the early Cold 
War24 focuses on the Truman presidency and its South African foreign policy.  
Borstellmann’s work is valuable for its research into the early period of the Cold War 
and how this influenced the United States relations with South Africa.  The National 
Party’s election victory in 1948 occurred just as the ‘Iron Curtain’ was descending over 
Europe and the contours of the Cold War were being drawn.  Borstellmann suggests 
that the US supported the National Party in the early days for two main reasons; the 
National Party was staunchly anti-communist, and the United States depended on the 
South African regime to supply it with uranium ore for its still developing nuclear 
programme.25  Princeton N. Lyman’s work, Partner to History: The U.S. Role in South 
Africa’s Transition to Democracy26 is particularly instructive for our research aims as its 
focus is on the transition period in South Africa and on the U.S. role in the transition.  
                                                 
24 Borstelmann, Thomas. Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early 
Cold War. New York: Oxford UP, 1993. Print. 
 
25 Other works that deal with the theme of the Cold War in Southern Africa, but with a broader approach 
than United States South African Relations include 
 
26 Lyman, Princeton N. Partner to History: The U.S. Role in South Africa's Transition to Democracy. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2002. Print. 
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Lyman was the United States Ambassador to South Africa from 1992-1995, and 
provides rich details on the end of the cold war and on the massive shifts that took place 
in world politics, including those of South Africa. 
 
Finally, South Africa’s relations with China;  there has not been nearly as much 
attention given to this relationship, though since the beginnings of official diplomatic 
relations in 1998 with the People’s Republic of China, there has been an increase in 
scholarly literature.27  The period prior to 1998 is more complex, based on the “Two 
China’s Issue” or the dispute in South Africa over diplomatic recognition between 
mainland China, (The People’s Republic of China) and Taiwan (The Republic of China).  
Taiwan was a strong diplomatic partner to South Africa during the apartheid era, and 
the issue of discontinuing relations with Taiwan in favour of Beijing was one of the first 
major public foreign policy debates to be held in the ‘New’ South Africa.28  There is 
scarce contact between Imperial China (the period up until 1911) and the Republic of 
China (mainland China from 1912 to 1949), even though during this time South Africa 
experienced the first wave of Chinese migrant labourers.  Historian Karen Harris has 
                                                 
27 See Taylor, Ian. "PRC Relations with South Africa." China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise. 
London: Routledge, 2006. 127-52. Print.  As well as the book by, Pere, Garth Le, and Garth Shelton. 
China, Africa and South Africa: South--South Co-operation in a Global Era. Midrand, South Africa: 
Institute for Global Dialogue, 2007. Print.  Chris Alden has written on the early post-apartheid years and 
leading up to 1998 diplomatic agreement in Alden, Chris. "Solving South Africa's Chinese Puzzle: 
Democratic Foreign Policy Making and the ‘two Chinas’ Question." South Africa's Foreign Policy: 
Dilemmas of a New Democracy. Ed. J. Broderick. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001. 
Print. 
 
28 Martyn Davies gives an overview and comparison of South Africa’s relations with the People’s Republic 
of China and the Republic of China.  His dissertation is the most comprehensive study of South Africa’s 
relations with the PRC prior to 1994.  Davies, Martyn. "South Africa Relations with the PRC and the ROC 
1949 to 1995: The Questions of Diplomatic Recognition." Diss. University of the Witwatersrand, 1996. 
Print. 
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conducted in-depth research into the history of Chinese migration to South Africa, 
focusing on the colonial period.29 
 
1.7  Chapter Outline 
Chapter Two will begin with an examination of the Cold War and its impact on 
South Africa, and specifically on South African international relations and foreign policy.  
The purpose of this section is not to provide an exhaustive analysis of the Cold War in 
South Africa, but to establish that the Cold War had an indelible and defining role in the 
shaping of South African domestic and foreign policies.  Once this impact has been 
defined, we will look at the subsequent effects of the end of the Cold War and the end of 
a bipolar world; South Africa’s domestic political transition began against the backdrop 
of this global transition.  Was there a relationship between these two events?  As these 
historic events unfolded, world leaders and academics alike struggled to define this new 
period of history.  What was the position of South Africa in this ‘New World Order’, and 
just what was this ‘New Order’?  The chapter will show that South African leaders early 
on grasped the gravitas of the period and quickly adopted the language and rhetoric 
being espoused by the world’s lone superpower --the United States. 
 
Chapter Three will examine the use of history in South Africa’s international 
relations.  A prominent feature of South African domestic politics for many decades has 
been the use of history, although little attention has been paid to its usage in foreign 
relations.  A brief survey of the use and invocation of history in South African politics will 
                                                 
29 Harris, Karen. "A History of the Chinese in South Africa to 1912." D Litt et Phil, University of South 
Africa, 1998. Print.  Also, see Harris, Karen. "The Chinese in South Africa: A Preliminary Overview to 
1910." Kleio XXVI (1994): Print. 
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provide the context for the related study of the use of history in international relations.  
In examining history as a “diplomatic tool”, we will look at examples of this in South 
Africa’s relationship with the United States.  Within this section a portion will be 
dedicated to analysing continuities and discontinuities of history usage in the ‘Old’ and 
the ‘New’ South Africa.   This will be contrasted with a section on history usage in 
Chinese South African foreign relations.  The twin themes of history and identity will be 
considered throughout this chapter, which will conclude with a study questioning 
whether or not there has been a project in South Africa to consciously embrace a new 
national historic identity. 
 
Chapter four will examine the issue of transitions in government policy through a 
case study of the nationalization debate in South Africa.  This particular example allows 
once again for comparisons and contrasts with South Africa under a National Party led 
government, and South Africa under an ANC led government.  The chapter begins with 
a study of nationalization under the National Party and the connected question of 
locating the role of the state in the economy under the National Party.  The chapter will 
then pose the same question of the state’s role in the post 1994 economy.  The 
development of ANC economic policy occurred against the backdrop of a global shift 
towards market led growth and privatization.  What impact did this growing global 










The “New World Order” and the “End of History”:  The Global Context 
to South Africa’s Political Transition 
 
“We stand at the gates of an important epoch, a time of ferment, when spirit moves 
forward in a leap, transcends its previous shape and takes on a new one.  All the mass 
of previous representations, concepts, and bonds linking our world together are 
dissolving and collapsing like a dream picture.  A new phase of the spirit is preparing 
itself.” –G. W. F. Hegel30   
 
 
"The irony of democratic South Africa's late entry into international affairs is that we can 













                                                 
30 G. W. F. Hegel from lecture of September 18, 1806. Quoted in Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History 
and the Last Man. New York: Free, 1992. Print. 
 
31 President Mandela, in a speech at the UN World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen on 12 
March 1995.  
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2.1  Introduction 
The political restructuring that took place in Europe at the end of the 1980s and 
early 1990s resulting in the end of the Cold War, had a profound effect on the entire 
international community.  For over forty years, international politics had been defined by 
the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States.  States’ foreign 
policies were in large part determined by their position within the Cold War and whether 
or not they were with the “West” or the Communist states.  A defining feature of the 
Cold War was the lack of direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and America.  
Instead, conflict was pursued through a series of proxy wars that involved allies and 
satellite states.  As this period of bipolarity drew to a close, so, too, did a number of 
conflicts that had been fuelled by the two great powers’ rivalry.  In this chapter we will 
first begin with a brief overview of the Soviet Reforms that paved the way for the 
opening up of the Soviet Union and the thawing of relations with the United States.  
Along with this overview will be a timeline of the important events that shaped the 
conclusion of the Cold War with the purpose being to provide an international context 
for the events taking place in South Africa at the same time.  The question of how South 
Africa was affected by the end of the Cold War, and how certain domestic political 
decisions were closely linked to the international climate of the period will be given close 
attention.  We will find that South Africa, like all countries in the world, was affected by 
the end of bipolarity, but that in South Africa this impact was even more profound.  
Likewise, the exploratory phase that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
consolidation of world power to the United States, was a powerful influence on South 
Africa’s own period of transition.  As this new period of world history began, many 
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attempts were made at defining and classifying the new theme of world affairs.  
Definitions of the “new world order” are important for this chapter as we continue to 
consider South Africa’s position in the world and, more pointedly in this case, South 
Africa’s position in the new world order.  Special consideration will be given to two 
American academics whose theories on the new period of world history stirred 
worldwide debate, including in South Africa.  The end goal of this chapter will be to 
show that during South Africa’s transition period, it was particularly influenced and 
sensitive to the events taking place in global politics.   
 
2.2  Soviet Reforms 
The 11th of March 1985 saw Mikhail Gorbachev’s accession to power as General 
Secretary of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. He was the fourth Soviet leader 
to take up the post since 1982, but at the spry age of 54 it was hoped that he would 
have more staying power than the former leaders.32  Upon becoming General 
Secretary, Gorbachev undertook a review period to examine the state of the Soviet 
economy and labour system.  Gorbachev understood that it was absolutely necessary 
to the Soviet Union’s survival that there be cut backs on arms expenditure and an 
improvement in economic output.  In doing so, he hoped to create a favourable 
international atmosphere for the Soviet Union that would create space for dialogue with 
the West. i.e. the United States.33   
                                                 
32 The Previous two General Secretaries of the Party, Konstantin Chernenko, and Yuri Andropov, did not 
even serve for two years before dying in office.  
 
33 Dockrill, Saki. The End of the Cold War Era: The Transformation of the Global Security Order. London: 
Hodder Arnold, 2005. 23. Print. 
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Gorbachev realized that the economy could not improve without first accomplishing 
major political reforms of the government system and the modernization of Soviet 
society.  To accomplish this, Gorbachev launched the twin concepts of Glasnost 
(openness) and perestroika (restructuring).  The terms were purposefully vague, so as 
to allow Gorbachev and other Party leaders leeway as they continued to define and 
refine the terms.  Saki Ruth Dockrill frames these terms in their practical applications 
saying; 
Glasnost meant increasing the circulation of information in society, 
loosening central political control over the media, and encouraging 
relatively free artistic and literary activities.  Perestroika under Gorbachev 
came to mean reforming and improving all aspects of Soviet society, its 
economy and the Party-state political systems, and the term was used 
synonymously with Gorbachev’s policy of reforms.34   
 
The reform aspect of perestroika meant loosening the state’s iron grip on the economy 
and moving towards market driven principles.  Gorbachev was very pointed in making it 
clear that this did not mean a complete embrace of capitalism, but rather a slow and 
steady reform away from a command economy towards a more market based economy. 
The purpose of this brief overview of Gorbachev’s reform vision was to contextualize 
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and frame some of the key 
summits that were taking place between the United States and the Soviet Union during 
this period.  One of the goals of Gorbachev’s domestic reforms was to open up talks 
between the West and the Soviets, and the overture did not go unnoticed in 
Washington.  The following section provides a timeline and sketch of some of the 
                                                 
34 Dockrill, Saki. The End of the Cold War Era: The Transformation of the Global Security Order. London: 
Hodder Arnold, 2005. 24. Print. 
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important summits that took place during the late 1980s that paved the way for the 
ending of the Cold War and the birth of a new world order.   
 
2.3  The End of the Cold War:  A Timeline 
 1985—Mikhail Gorbachev becomes General Secretary of the Soviet Communists 
Party. 
 1986—On October 11 and 12 Gorbachev and Reagan meet for the Reykjavik 
Summit. 
 1987—December 8-10 Gorbachev and Regan hold Washington Summit and sign 
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. 
 1988—May 25 to June 3, the Moscow Summit opened discussions on human 
rights, security, and other bilateral issues. 
 1988—December 7th, Gorbachev delivers a groundbreaking speech to the United 
Nations General Assembly calling for the beginning of a “new world order”.   
 1989—May 29th to June 4th, Tiananmen Square Protests in Beijing.35 
 1989—November 9th, the Berlin Wall falls. 
 1990—October 3, German reunification.  
                                                 
35 The reason Tiananmen Square is included on the list, is because it was an extremely important 
moment not just for China but for the worldwide community and provided a further catalyst to ending the 
Cold War.  In late May 1989, masses of protesters filled Tiananmen Square to challenge the authority of 
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping.  The protesters were emboldened by Gorbachev being on an official state 
visit in the city in order to improve Sino-Soviet relations.  On June 3-4 Deng Xiaoping ordered the forceful 
removal of the protesters from the square.  The ensuing violence reportedly shocked Gorbachev who was 
dismayed by the level of bloodshed.  Gorbachev became all the more determined to push through with 
his reform programme and pursue a different course.  Following Tiananmen, China retreated for a period 
from the world stage.  For more on the subject of China’s influence on the end of the Cold War process 
see, Tuncker, Nancy Bernkopf. “China as a Factor in the Collapse of the Soviet Empire.”  Political 
Science Quarterly 110, no. 4 (Winter 1995-1996). Print. 
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 1991—December 26, the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR). 
The Cold War, often dated from 1947 until 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, 
in the most basic sense refers to the period of heightened tension and confrontation 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, along with each country’s 
accompanying allies.  The complex series of events that culminated in the end of the 
war cannot be fully analyzed here, but historians36 agree that Gorbachev’s ascension to 
the helm of the Communist Party leadership in 1985 was a watershed moment.  A year 
later on October 11th and 12th, 1986, Gorbachev and President Reagan held in-person 
talks in Reykjavik.  What has now become known as the “Reykjavik Summit” collapsed 
and no formal agreements were made, however both sides agreed in principle to the 
removing of Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces from Europe.  Furthermore, the summit 
was an important testing ground for both parties in calculating what concessions could 
be pushed for.  This has led many observers and historians37 to place the summit as 
facilitating and laying the groundwork for the Washington Summit on December 8th to 
10th, 1987.  A notable accomplishment of the Washington Summit was the signing of 
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.  The INF Treaty eliminated all 
nuclear-armed ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 
and 5,500 kilometres.  Unlike treaties and talks before it, the INF treaty was the first 
nuclear arms control agreement to actually reduce nuclear arms, rather than establish 
                                                 
36 See the extremely thorough third volume of The Cambridge History of the Cold War, which traces the 
beginning of the ending of the Cold War to when Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Soviet 
Communist Party in 1985.  Leffler, Melvyn P., and Odd Arne. Westad. The Cambridge History of the Cold 
War. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010. Print. 
 
37 Leffler, Melvyn P., and Odd Arne. Westad. The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2010. Print. 
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ceilings that could not be exceeded.  Several more meetings occurred between the two 
presidents to discuss issues of human rights, international security, and bilateral issues.  
The Moscow Summit, held from May 25th 1988 until June 3rd, 1988, examined in detail 
issues like the impending withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, as well as 
Soviet involvement in Southern Africa and in particular Angola.  The sustained length of 
the Moscow Summit signalled that the relationship between the United States and the 
USSR was improving dramatically, and that things were moving beyond the “talkshop” 
stage.  This was confirmed on December 7th, 1988, when Gorbachev delivered a 
ground-breaking speech to the United Nations General Assembly, which we will 
examine in greater detail in the next section.  The most dramatic event in the wind-down 
of the Cold War however was, without a doubt, the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 
9th 1989.  The Berlin Wall was one of the great symbols of the Cold War and stood as 
both a physical and metaphorical barrier between East and West.  The wall came down 
just two years after Reagan’s famous speech in Berlin in which he called on Gorbachev 
to “tear down this wall!”38  The next year, on October 3rd, 1990, German unification 
became official ending the division that had begun in 1945.  In less than one year, on 
December 26th, 1991, the Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics dissolved, bringing not 




                                                 
38 See the Reagan Foundation Archive http://www.reaganfoundation.org/berlin-wall.aspx 
 
39 For a more detailed overview of the events at the conclusion of the Cold War see Sarotte, E. Mary, 
1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2009.  
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2.4  A ‘New Order’ or ‘The End of History’? 
The disappearance of the power struggle between “East” and “West” or between 
socialism and capitalism, or however else analysts and practitioners characterized the 
struggle  of the Cold War, ushered in a new age.  We must appreciate the disorientation 
that also ensued with this dramatic ending.  Suddenly the orientation and bearings of 
almost all states and their position within the international system was taken away.  
States were forced to ask critical questions like “What is the enemy now?” and “Who are 
our allies?”40  Many analysts and politicians were cognizant that what was occurring in 
Europe and the Soviet Union was a turning point in the history of twentieth century 
international relations, but beyond iterations of a “New World Order”, few were able to 
articulate a vision that encapsulated and characterized this new phase of international 
relations.  Apart from the absence of the Soviet Union and the end of a bipolar world, 
what was this “New Order”?   
 
The following sections explore the development and origins of the term “New 
World Order”.  The study will also include an examination of two leading voices from the 
immediate post-Cold War period, namely Francis Fukuyama and Samuel P. Huntington.  
These two Americans both attempted to answer the question of “what next?” after the 
conclusion of the Cold War, and their answers at the time sparked a strong debate that 
was not just confined to American academic circles, but included responses from 
Europe, Asia, and Africa.  The response from South Africa will be examined in 
                                                 
40 The Cold War international system was extremely complex and my intention is not to make two 
simplistic categories of those with the “West” and those with the USSR.  Many countries decided to be 
nonaligned and stay clear of Cold War power politics, but even in nonalignment their international 
relations were informed by the Cold War dynamic.  Put another way the question of “which side are you 
on?” had to be answered no matter what, even if the answer was “no one’s side”.   
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particular, but what makes the inclusion of these two voices all the more pertinent for 
this study is how both examined South Africa’s political transition through their own 
theories on the development and future of the new world order.  As we will see, the 
inclusion of South Africa in Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s respective theories is an 
example of how South Africa’s political transition was closely observed by the 
international community and that attempts were made by certain politicians both inside 
and outside of South Africa to characterize the transition as not merely domestic, but as 
part of a broader international movement.   
 
2.4.1  Phrasing History: The Development of the term “New World 
Order” 
The first instance of the term “New World Order” was not in fact issued by an 
American, but by Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev.  On December 7, 1988 
Gorbachev delivered a speech at the United Nations General Assembly, which has 
become enshrined as one of the most groundbreaking speeches delivered to the UN 
general assembly.  The speech was an extension of the unprecedented Moscow 
Summit earlier that same year in which the United States and the Soviets held bilateral 
talks on a host of issues.  Gorbachev’s UN speech was the first public speech by a Cold 
War superpower that concretely outlined the steps being taken to end the Cold War.   
The speech also outlined Gorbarchev’s vision of the new period of world history and the 
beginnings of a new order.  In his own words: 
We are witnessing most profound social change. Whether in the East or 
the South, the West or the North, hundreds of millions of people, new 
nations and states, new public movements and ideologies have moved to 
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the forefront of history. Broad-based and frequently turbulent popular 
movements have given expression, in a multidimensional and 
contradictory way, to a longing for independence, democracy and social 
justice. The idea of democratizing the entire world order has become a 
powerful socio-political force.  At the same time, the scientific and 
technological revolution has turned many economic, food, energy, 
environmental, information and population problems, which only recently 
we treated as national or regional ones, into global problems. Thanks to 
the advances in mass media and means of transportation, the world 
seems to have become more visible and tangible. International 
communication has become easier than ever before.41 
 
Definitions of the new world order are often elusive due to the many tendrils and 
topics that are associated with the concept.  This excerpt from Gorbachev’s speech 
touches on one of the associated topics, globalization42, which would later become an 
important concept in debates surrounding the new world order.   Gorbachev talked 
about a democratization movement that is not confined to the Soviet Union alone, but 
instead included all corners of the globe.  Gorbachev’s use of the term “world order” 
displaced the nation state as the main driver of international change, and instead the 
state became a component within an overarching system.  In Gorbachev’s interpretation 
of globalization, the new interconnected world has no local problems, only global  ̶ 
therefore by applying this logic there can no longer be local movements, only global.  In 
short, globalization within this framework is a synonym for universalism.43  To achieve 
these global aims, Gorbachev called for tolerance to be the banner of the new world 
                                                 
41 See the Wilson Center archive http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org/coldwarfiles/files/Documents/1988-
1107.Gorbachev.pdf 
 
42 Globalization, is yet another concept and topic lacking a precise definition.  Here it is understood as the 
movement towards a closer world, one in which trade, borders and ideas flow more freely. 
 
43 This interpretation of globalization is an important point to note and in part aids in interpreting 
Fukuyama’s theory on South Africa’s part in the “End of History”.  It will also be pertinent in our final 
chapter when we deal with the rise of the “Washington Consensus” and its influence in South Africa.   
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order saying, “For a new type of progress throughout the world to become a reality, 
everyone must change.  Tolerance is the alpha and omega of a new world order.”44 
The themes of universalism and globalization as associated and inseparable ideas were 
taken up in the book The Changing Global Order: World Leaders Reflect45 .  The book 
is a compendium of essays written by world leaders including Fidel Castro, George 
Bush Senior, Koffi Annan, Benazir Bhutto, and Bill Gates.  The impetus behind the book 
was not just to provide a compendium of world leaders’ thoughts on the development of 
a new international order, but more precisely to provide a “collage of the unfolding world 
mind”46.  The uniqueness of the book is owed to it being one of the first publications 
following the Cold War to compile the viewpoints of leaders from across the globe with 
the express purpose of discussing the dramatic changes taking place in international 
relations, trade, and technology.  With more than forty leaders represented in the 
publication, the goal was not to seek consensus on any one issue, but to represent the 
plurality of viewpoints on topics of global importance.  However, one theme that every 
leader agreed upon in the book was that as the twentieth century was drawing to a 
close, a new global order was taking shape, one that was being led by the United 
States. 
 
America’s leadership in this new world order was put to the test when, on August 
2nd, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait.  The invasion was met with immediate international 
                                                 
44 See the Wilson center archive http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org/coldwarfiles/files/Documents/1988-
1107.Gorbachev.pdf 
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condemnation.  For the United States, the invasion of Kuwait provided the perfect 
opportunity to test its leadership capabilities in a new unipolar world.  Taking his cue 
from Gorbachev, U.S. President H.W. Bush adopted the term “new world order”, using it 
at least 42 times in public statements between the summer of 1990 until the conclusion 
of the Gulf War in February 1991.   
 
On September 11, 1990, President G.W. Bush gave a speech to a joint session 
of Congress on the topic of the Persian Gulf Crisis in which he outlined a plan for 
pursuing a new world order, intimately connected with the Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.  
Bush saw the invasion as not only a test for the world, but as an opportunity to build a 
new diplomatic coalition and partnership and mend the divide between East and West.   
In his own words: 
No longer can a dictator count on East-West confrontation to stymie 
concerted United Nations action against aggression. A new partnership of 
nations has begun.  We stand today at a unique and extraordinary 
moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare 
opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these 
troubled times, our fifth objective -- a new world order -- can emerge: a 
new era -- freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, 
and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the 
world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in 
harmony.47  
 
The Gulf War saw the U.S. lead a coalition army of 34 nations. The United States was 
seeking to mould exactly this type of international cooperation in the new world order; 
an order that coalesced around a new set of international norms.  The important caveat 
                                                 
47 Bush, George HW. "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the 
Federal Budget Deficit." Washington. 9 Sept. 1990. 
Http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2217&year=1990&month=9.Web. 
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was that these norms as well as the cooperation were set and led by the U.S.  As we 
will see, this leadership was flexed again during South Africa’s transition to democracy, 
in what the U.S. saw as another opportunity to help shape a new world order.  
Political leaders were not the only ones enamoured with the idea of a new world order.  
Two leading academics from America, Francis Fukuyama and Samuel P. Huntington, 
became influential critics in defining the new period of world history.  
 
In 1989, National Interest published an article entitled The End of History48 by 
Francis Fukuyama.  The article put forward an explanation on the events occurring in 
the Soviet Union as it became more apparent that the world was on the brink of an 
historic shift in power.  The essay’s thesis immediately sparked a debate that went 
beyond the confines of American academic circles and led to Fukuyama publishing a 
book under the modified title of The End of History and the Last Man49 in 1992.  
Fukuyama proposed that by using a Hegelian historical framework, one could explain 
the triumph of liberal democracy over communist and authoritarian regimes.  The recent 
events in the communist bloc were proof for Fukuyama that there is “something like a 
Universal History of mankind in the direction of liberal democracy.”50  The logic was that 
since democracy was now victorious, mankind must have reached the “end of history”; 
not in the sense that important events no longer happened, but that with the 
universalization of Western liberal democracy, ideological evolution had reached a final 
                                                 
48 Fukuyama, Francis. "The End of History?" The National Interest Summer (1989): 44-57. Print. 
 
49 Fukuyama F, the End of History and the Last Man. London: Penguin, 47. 1992. Print. 
 
50 Ibid, 48. 
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stage in which the major issues have been resolved.  Fukuyama, in his own words, 
described the link between the global political events and his thesis in this way:  “We 
may be witnessing, the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s 
ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final 
form of human government.”51 Fukuyama envisioned that with the collapse of 
ideological competition a harmonious period of international cooperation would ensue 
and that violent conflicts would dramatically decrease, especially in the developed 
world.   
 
In 1993, Samuel Huntington published a response in Foreign Affairs to his former 
student Fukuyama52.  In contrast to Fukuyama, he envisioned a post-Cold War world 
order with dramatically increased cultural conflict.  He agreed with Fukuyama that the 
age of ideological conflict was over, but disagreed that it was being replaced with 
consensus over liberal democratic values and principles.  Instead, the world was 
reverting back to its natural order; an order characterized by cultural and religious 
conflict.  In his own words: 
It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new 
world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great 
divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be 
cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, 
but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and 
groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate 
                                                 
51 Fukuyama F, the End of History and the Last Man. London: Penguin, 47. 1992. 92. Print. 
 
52 Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 72.3 (1993): 22-49. Print.  Like 
Fukuyama, Huntington’s initial article formed the basis of a book that he later published in 1996.  See, 
Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1996. Print. 
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global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines 
of the future.53 
 
Huntington was acquainted with South African politics, having visited the country 
several times since his initial visit in 198154.  Throughout the 1980s, Huntington became 
a trusted advisor on political reforms to the South African government.55  In 1992, a 
senior South African government official interviewed by the Executive Intelligence 
Review (EIR) summed up Huntington’s influence in Pretoria saying: 
He has enormous influence among politicians in the government, and has 
played a very, very important part in influencing politicians like [Foreign 
Minister] Pik Botha and [Minister for Constitutional Development] Roelf 
Meyer. Huntington has visited South Africa at the last count I had, 15 
times, as a guest of the Department of Foreign Affairs. There were also 
quite a number of South African government officials and young ministers 
who spent time in the U.S., studying with him. He was particularly close to 
Roelf Meyer56 
 
The influence was reciprocal, and Huntington’s work throughout the 1990s reflected his 
experiences in South Africa.  It was especially evident in his 1991 book, The Third 
Wave, on the transition of states from authoritarian regimes to democratic governments 
and referenced the experience of South Africa several times.57  The book placed South 
Africa’s democratic transition within the broader global transition towards democracy. 
                                                 
53 Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 72.3 (1993): 22-49. Print 
 
54 Huntington’s 1981 visit was as a guest of the Department of Foreign Affairs and during which he 
provided the key-note address at the Biennial Conference of the Political Science Association of South 
Africa at Rand Afrikaans University, Johannesburg, September 17, 1981.  The paper was later published 
in 1982.  See Huntington, Samuel P. ”Reform and Stability in South Africa.” International Security Spring 
6.4 (1992): 3-25. Print. 
 
55 Hermann Giliomee, provides an account of the influence Huntington had over the reform process of the 
1980s and in particular President Botha.  See Giliomee, Hermann. "Great Expecations: Pres. PW Botha's 
Rubicon Speech of 1985." New Contree 55 (2008): 1-41. Print 
 
56 Executive Intelligence Review 19.45 (1992): 29-31. Print. 
 
57 Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: U of 
Oklahoma, 1991. Print. 




In a speech delivered at the Global Strategy Forum, former President F.W. de 
Klerk spoke of the trends in international relations since the fall of the Berlin wall in 
1989.  De Klerk pointed to cultural and religious divisions as the main source of conflict 
in the international environment. He went so far as to say that cultural and religious 
differences would be the greatest challenge of the new millennium.  While there was no 
mention of Huntington, it was clear that de Klerk was referencing his “clash of 
civilizations” theory, further proof of Huntington’s deep impact upon South African policy 
makers and government.58   
 
2.4.2  South Africa and the End of History Theory 
In this section, we will look at the South African response to Fukuyama’s End of 
History Thesis, which unusually involved academics as well as politicians.59  Opinions 
on Fukuyama were especially strong after the publication of an article on South Africa 
by him in 1991, entitled The Next South Africa.60  The article was published in both The 
National Interest and the South Africa International. The publication by an eminent 
American political scientist, following his controversial 1989 article on The End of 
History, highlights two trends important for placing South Africa’s political transition 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
58 De Klerk, F.W. "The Impact of the Fall of the Berlin Wall on South Africa and the World." Global 
Strategy Forum. London. 16 Nov. 2009. Speech. http://www.globalstrategyforum.org/wp-
content/uploads/upload85.pdf 
 
59 It’s worth noting that Fukuyama has had a keen interest in South Africa since his first research trip to 
the country in 1991.  Since 2011 Fukuyama has served as an adjunct Professor in the University of Cape 
Town’s Graduate School of Development Policy and Practice.  During his time at the school he has given 
public lectures and directed executive courses for South African political leaders.   
 
60 Fukuyama, Francis. "The Next South Africa." The National Interest June (1991): 13-28. Print. 
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within a global context.  Firstly, this transition was being closely observed by the 
international community as already seen from Samuel Huntington’s involvement, and 
secondly, Fukuyama attempted in his article to internationalize South Africa’s transition 
by promoting the triumph of capitalism over apartheid.  The logic was that capitalism 
had defeated both the Soviet Union and the Apartheid Government.  The article on 
South Africa places a heavy emphasis on forces of production.  Fukuyama asserted that 
urbanization, education, and the growth of the middle class inevitably led to the birth of 
democracy, and according to his research all three factors were evident amongst the 
Afrikaners’ in the preceding fifty years: 
. . .  there is no question that economic change provides a very helpful 
environment for liberal democratic ideas to take hold.  Middle-class 
societies with large numbers of college-educated, urban professionals — 
those we have learned to call ‘yuppies’ in the 1980s — simply have a  
different type of politics than uneducated and illiterate smallholders in 
predominantly agrarian societies.  In the latter, it is possible for 
authoritarian rulers to mobilize poorly educated followers into armies or 
death squads.... It is precisely the transformation from smallholder to 
yuppie that has occurred within South Africa’s Afrikaner community over 
the past forty years.  The unbanning of the ANC did not undermine the 
political base of the National Party among whites; if anything, de Klerk’s 
support among whites is higher than it was when he first came into office.  
This indicates that he was not simply leading Afrikaner opinion by his 
surprising moves, but reflecting it as well.61 
 
Fukuyama’s linkage of economic and demographic change in South Africa as the 
primary factors leading to political change was challenged in 1995 by South African 
political scientist, Rupert Taylor.  Taylor published an article critiquing Fukuyama’s 
interpretation of the end of apartheid.62  The article undertook a critical assessment of 
                                                 
61 Fukuyama, Francis. "The Next South Africa." The National Interest June (1991): 14. Print. 
 
62 Taylor, Rupert. "The End of Apartheid as Part of ‘the End of History'?" South African Journal of 
International Affairs 3.1 (1995): 22-32. Print 
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Fukuyama’s conclusion that South Africa’s political transition was a part of the global 
movement towards the End of History, and in particular Fukuyama’s linkage of 
economic growth and the demise of Apartheid, observing:  
Placing South Africa and the end of apartheid in a larger pattern of world 
history, Fukuyama sees social change to be the result of a coherent 
pattern of internal economic growth first played out and made evident in 
the most developed countries in the world; thereby proclaiming the victory 
of capitalism over the forces of apartheid.63  
 
Rupert believed that the empirical evidence that Fukuyama employed to back up 
his theory was both weak and misapplied and that the misapplication was in large part 
due to his ideological bias. The meta-nature of Fukuyama’s end of history theory and 
his attempt to place the transition within this theoretical framework blinded him to the 
unique realities that South Africa faced.64   
 
Rupert’s criticism was not the consensus amongst senior South African 
government members.  According to Dave Steward, chief of staff to President F.W. de 
Klerk, the phrase “end of history” held a certain resonance for some National Party 
leaders during the early 1990s. Steward claimed that “there was this feeling amongst 
some government leaders, and I think it may have contributed to the transition and the 
thinking of the transition; that it was South Africa’s ‘end of history’ moment.  Similar to 
what Fukuyama talked about.”65  Despite this concession, there is little to suggest that 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
63 Taylor, Rupert. "The End of Apartheid as Part of ‘the End of History'?" South African Journal of 
International Affairs 3.1 (1995): 27. Print 
 
64 Ibid, 29. 
 
65 "Interview with Dave Steward." Personal interview. 20 June 2013. Cape Town 
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South Africa’s leaders were influenced by any more than the dramatic phrasing of 
Fukuyama’s theory.  Steward’s comments, though, are further evidence of just how 
pervasive Fukuyama’s thinking had become in certain South African ruling circles, even 
if the exact theory was not grasped.   
 
2.5  South Africa and the “New World Order” 
At the dawn of its democratic transition, South African encountered a world it had 
had little influence in shaping – a world it was fundamentally unprepared for. The 
following section outlines the ways in which both South Africa’s government, as well as 
the leading anti-apartheid movement, the ANC, were shaped and influenced by the 
events taking place in the global arena.  It also includes an examination of South 
Africa’s reactions and role in the “New World Order”.   
 
The developments in the Soviet Union had an immediate impact on Southern 
Africa, as it had been the leading ally and partner to the ANC as well as of the South 
African Communist Party.  Gorbachev’s domestic reform process initiated in 1986 
included the Soviet Union’s international relations66, and its withdrawal of military 
support from Southern Africa.  This had a dramatic effect on the conflict in Angola and 
Namibia where Soviet and Cuban military support played a vital part in the war and 
posed a threat to the Apartheid regime’s security. In 1988, the New York Accords, or 
                                                 
66 In 1987, Gorbachev spoke to a group of Western visitors about the new thinking on foreign policy 
saying “out international policy is more than ever determined by our domestic policy, by constructive 
endeavors to improve our country.  That is why we need peace, predictability and constructiveness in 
international relations.”  Quoted in  Campbell, Kurt M. Soviet Policy towards South Africa. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1986. Print. 
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Three Powers Accord, were signed by the governments of Angola, Cuba, and South 
Africa at the United Nations headquarters.  The accords were strongly supported by the 
Soviet Union, and brokered by the United States, signalling the easing of Cold War 
tensions.67  The accords ended the direct involvement of foreign troops in the Angolan 
Civil War and granted independence to Namibia.  As a part of the agreement, the ANC 
were required to remove their bases from Angola. This stipulation dealt a heavy blow to 
the ANC’s strategy of an armed struggle and the overthrow of apartheid. The final blow 
to the ANC’s armed struggle came on November 9, 1989 with the fall of the Berlin 
Wall.68 
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall set in motion a chain of events across the communist 
bloc of countries in Eastern Europe that eventually led to the break-up of the Soviet 
Union in 1991.  Communism, and the Soviet bloc in particular, had been facing a crisis 
already for quite sometime, but the speed at which the events took place shocked the 
entire world. As the balance of power shifted in the international order during this time, 
regional power transitions and brokerages were enabled.  South Africa is a prime 
example.  It is no coincidence that de Klerk’s landmark February 1990 speech 
unbanning the ANC, came a mere three months after the fall of the Berlin Wall.  De 
Klerk alluded to the developments in Europe and the accompanying opportunities that 
came with them in his speech, declaring, “The dynamic developments in international 
                                                 
67 The New York Accords established a joint monitory commission with both the United States and the 
Soviet Union acting as observers to oversee implementation of the accords.  This aspect of the accords 
highlights the importance of Soviet and US cooperation to South Africa’s successful negotiation period.   
 
68 Angola-Cuba-South Africa Agreement on implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 435 
(1978) S/20346, December 22, 1988.  
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/AO_881222_TripartiteAgreement%28en%29.pdf  
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politics have created new opportunities for South Africa.”69 These opportunities included 
being unshackled from the ideological struggle against communism and the prospect of 
new international relations.  The loss of the ANC’s chief ally, the Soviet Union, however, 
provided the greatest opportunity for De Klerk’s government. De Klerk elaborated on the 
perceived threat that the Soviets posed to South Africa in his 2009 address at the 
Global Strategy Forum.70  It was a commonly held belief in government circles that the 
SACP had great influence over key functions within the ANC alliance; by extension, the 
Soviets did as well, due to their strong relationship with the SACP.71  De Klerk 
acknowledged that the collapse of the Soviet Union, symbolized by the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, provided the perfect occasion to open negotiations, or in his words, “…it opened a 
window of opportunity through which we unhesitatingly jumped.”72 Surveying the 
situation in Europe from South Africa, De Klerk surmised that communism was in 
“headlong disarray”, and the South African Communist Party was in “shell shocked 
retreat” – “`never again would the balance of forces be so favourable for an equitable 
negotiated settlement.”73  The experience of the 1988 New York Accords had reassured 
the South African government that it could secure its core interests through negotiations 
with its opponents.   
                                                 




70 De Klerk, F.W. "The Impact of the Fall of the Berlin Wall on South Africa and the World." Global 
Strategy Forum. London. 16 Nov. 2009. Speech. http://www.globalstrategyforum.org/wp-
content/uploads/upload85.pdf   
 
71 Ellis, Stephen. External Mission: The ANC in Exile, 1960-1990. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2012. 
Print. 
 
72 De Klerk, F.W. “The Impact of the Fall of the Berlin Wall on South Africa and the World.” 
 
73 Ibid 
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The timing of the negotiations was opportune not only for South Africa and the 
retreating Soviet Union, but for the United States as well.  The U.S. was eager to 
refocus its international interests with the end of bipolarity, and Southern Africa was 
given top priority for this restructuring process.  According to Princeton Lyman, who was 
the US ambassador to South Africa from 1992 to 1995, the region had been of great 
strategic interest to the US during the Cold War. In his memoir of the US role in the 
transition and his time as ambassador, he recounts the balance of interests shaping US 
engagement with South Africa: 
Southern Africa had been one of the fiercely contended battlefronts of the 
Cold War.  Throughout the region, Cold War concerns had lain heavily 
over U.S. policy…in South Africa itself, where repugnance at apartheid 
was tempered by the concern over the ANC’s close alliance with the 
South African Communist Party.  Not only did the Soviet threat vanish at 
the end of the decade.  So did much of the controversy surrounding 
constructive engagement, after it climaxed in 1988 with an agreement that 
simultaneously brought independence to Namibia and the withdrawal of 
Cuban troops from Angola.74 
 
As a result of these changes, South Africa was downgraded in its strategic 
categorization.  It still warranted the most American attention in Africa, but there was no 
longer the same pressure.  Ambassador Lyman put it this way; “Southern Africa was no 
longer on the ‘front line’ of a conflict regarding American global interests.”75     
 
Whilst South Africa may have been strategically downgraded during the early 
1990s, the U.S. began to see South Africa as an ally and not just a tactical partner in 
                                                 
74 Lyman, Princeton N. "The Wind Shifts." Partner to History: The U.S. Role in South Africa's Transition to 
Democracy. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2002. 45-46. Print. 
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the fight against communism.  Some policy makers began to envision South Africa as a 
leading example of the “New World Order” being heralded by the Bush Administration.  
Speaking to one senior policy maker in the State Department’s Bureau of African 
Affairs, who worked in South Africa during the early 1990s, this respondent described 
the hopes of South Africa being the African “champion” of the “New World Order”, and 
the harbinger of a tide of democracy to the continent.76 Secretary of State, Warren 
Christopher, in a 1996 address at the University of Witwatersrand, spoke of the 
leadership potential which South Africa had in the new world order, saying “When I look 
around the world, I see very few countries with greater potential to help shape the 21st 
century than the new South Africa.”77  South Africa’s foreign policy practitioners 
recognized that with this new world order came new values, values that were largely set 
by the United States.  South Africa’s diplomat extraordinaire, Pik Botha, described the 
international climate in realist terms saying, “The world has changed. Western concepts 
of political and economic freedom are now dominant.  Taken as a value system, they 
are currently unchallenged.”78  Botha’s comments reflected the hegemonic nature of the 
new world order; but was South Africa willing or prepared to fulfill American hopes of 
becoming its African champion? 
 
                                                 
76 “Anonymous interview with former State Department Employee.” Personal Interview. February 19, 
2013, Cambridge MA. 
 
77 Christopher, Warren. "Address to South African Institute International Affairs." University of 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. 12 Oct. 1996. Http://www.latimes.com/.  Web. 17 June 2014. 
 
78 Botha, Pik. "The Outlook from Pretoria." From Pariah to Participant: South Africa's Evolving Foreign 
Relations, 1990-1994. Ed. Greg Mills. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1994. 
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South African leaders, both within the ANC as well as the National Party, were 
eager to take up a leadership role and to steer South Africa’s entry back into the 
international community.  This was displayed with the amount of international travel that 
both Mandela and de Klerk embarked on in the negotiation period.79  Between 1990 and 
mid-1992, Mandela made 16 overseas trips and visited 49 countries.  De Klerk, during 
the same time period, visited 32 countries, and some, like Britain and France, he visited 
multiple times.80  Why did the two leaders spend so much time on foreign visits and 
international relations when there were more than enough challenges at home?  James 
Barber proposes that the reason is partly because South Africa’s conflict had become 
international—whether it was the ANC seeking international support against the 
apartheid state, or the government trying to throw off its pariah status.81  The 
international setting provided a platform to improve their negotiation positions and 
project their respected causes.   
 
Despite the strong international dimension to both the negotiations leading up to 
1994 as well as the following transition in governments, there was often much confusion 
regarding South Africa’s foreign policy during this time.  Chris Alden offers a compelling 
explanation arguing that in part the confusion was driven by the ANC’s transition from a 
liberation force to becoming a government wherein they had to construct policies, not 
                                                 
79 The role that international politics and actors played during the negotiation period is well documented 
by Christopher Landsberg.  See Landsberg, Chris. The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation: International 
Politics and South Africa's Transition. Johannesburg: Jacana, 2004. Print. 
 
80 Facts and figures taken from Barber, James P. Mandela's World: The International Dimension of South 
Africa's Political Revolution 1990-99. Oxford: James Currey, 2004. 92. Print. 
 
81 Ibid, 94. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
43 
 
just oppose them.  For its entire history, the ANC’s international relations and foreign 
policies had been determined by its opposition to apartheid.  With this system quickly 
fading along with the familiar ideological sign posts of the cold war, the ANC was thrown 
off balance and struggled to adapt to the whirlwind of changes internationally.82  The 
difficulty showed in South Africa’s foreign policy of the period, which not only had to 
adapt to a new international system, but to the merging of historically opposed parties.  
During the negotiation period of the early 90s, as well as the Government of National 
Unity (GNU) from 1994 to 1997, there was a convergence of several foreign policy 
traditions.  These included traditions within the ANC as well as the National Party.  The 
traditions ranged from strong and even radical pan Africanist and “third worldist” 
discourse, to a middle power multilateralism, or even to a complete acceptance of the 
“new world order” international agenda.  Attempts to combine these often contradictory 
ideological strands created much confusion within the foreign policy making apparatus 
of South Africa’s government as well as on the world stage.83  An example of this was 
the ANC’s insistence on continuing its relations with controversial leaders such as 
Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi and Cuba’s Fidel Castro. The move both shocked and 
angered the U.S. and Western leaders.  In their view this was hardly behaviour befitting 
the country that they hoped would be a beacon of the new world order.  
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83 See Rolland, Denis, and José Flávio Sombra. Saraiva. Political Regime and Foreign Relations: A 
Historical Perspective. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2004. 117. Print. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
44 
 
In 1997, when news reached Washington that South Africa was preparing to sell 
arms to Syria, the U.S. responded by warning that millions of dollars in aid to South 
Africa would be suspended. President Mandela responded angrily, saying “we will 
conclude any agreements with any country whether they are popular in the West or 
not.”84  In spite of the strong response, the Mandela Presidency often utilized George 
Bush’s rhetoric in framing its foreign policy, and Mandela’s speechwriters cued the 
President to use the “new world order” phrase on several occasions.85  The end of the 
Cold War provided few coherent explanations and South Africa’s adoption of the 
dominant international rhetoric is as much a reflection of the ambiguity of the period as it 
is of South Africa’s position within it.  
 
In conclusion, we can see that South Africa’s political transition was closely 
linked to, and was influenced by, the international political events of the period, both in 
the lead up to the transition as well as in the subsequent negotiations.  South Africa’s 
political transition cannot be understood in full outside the context of global historical 






                                                 
84 "South Africa Rejects U.S. Warnings on Sale of Arms to Syria." New York Times 16 Jan. 1997. Print. 
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History as a Diplomatic Tool: Transitions in South Africa’s 
International Identity 
 
“My foreign policy is determined by the past, the relations I have had with the country, 
the contributions they have made to our struggle.”—President Nelson Mandela86 
 
“The one thing the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ South Africa have in common is a passion for 
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National identity and its construction have played a critical role in the domestic 
politics of South Africa88, China and the United States; however, it has also played a 
critical role in each nation’s respective89 foreign policy.90  Traditional studies of foreign 
policy posit that a state derives its foreign policy based on an assessment of spatial 
factors and material endowments in conformity with a broader set of social values. 91  
The values that society exerts to influence the foreign policy process are generally 
viewed as being concerned with security and wealth creation. This materially-biased 
assessment does not account adequately for the influence which the relationship 
between history and identity exerts over the foreign policy process. Thus, Chris Alden 
and Cristina Alves see this relationship as a vital ingredient in the building blocks of a 
                                                 
88 There are several excellent academic articles on the themes of national identity, and doing history in 
post-apartheid South Africa in, Stolten, Hans Erik., ed. History Making and Present Day Politics: The 
Meaning of Collective Memory in South Africa. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2007. Print.  This book 
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in Chapman, Michael. "The Problem of Identity: South Africa, Storytelling, and Literary History." New 
Literary History 29.1 (1998): 85-99. Print.  James Barber presents an overview of the impediments 
towards building a national identity in South Africa in Barber, James. "South Africa: The Search for 
Identity." International Affairs 70.1 (1994): 67-82. Print.  See as well Venter, Albert. Questions of National 
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direct sense than in any other culture I know.’ Westad, Odd Arne. Restless Empire: China and the World 
since 1750. New York: Basic, 2012. Print.  Henry Kissinger, also notes the importance of history to not 
only China’s domestic national identity, but how China views its position within the world system.  See 
Kissinger, Henry. On China. New York: Penguin, 2011. Print. Regarding the United States, historian 
Walter Hixson provides the most sweeping survey of the impact historical myths have had on US foreign 
policy.  He contends that the construction of a mythical national identity with the aid of history makes for a 
strong link between US foreign policy and the domestic culture from which it springs.  See Hixson, Walter 
L. The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy. New Haven: Yale UP, 
2008. Print. 
 
90 Alden, Chris, and Cristina Alves. "History & Identity in the Construction of China's Africa 
Policy." Review of African Political Economy 35.115 (2008): 43-58. Print.   
 
91 Ibid, 44   
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nation saying, “Seminal beliefs about origins of the ‘nation’, the boundaries of 
citizenship and physical territoriality, ideas about sovereign legitimacy and sources of 
threat are all products of the twin forces of history and identity.”92  Alden and Alves note 
that in this regard, national identity is a conscious construction of myths, akin to the 
historian Benedict Anderson’s “imagined community”93 in which history plays a vital role 
in the relationship between individuals and conceptions of the state.  They concede that 
a conscious management of identity through the construction of historical myths is a 
feature of all modern nations and societies; however, they hypothesize that newly 
independent states are more visible in their construction. This is due to a determined 
and definite break with the past or previous regime and with the need for new sources 
of external and domestic legitimacy.  Typically, the natural source for legitimizing and 
solidifying the national identity is found in foreign policy.  In their own words:   
[f]or the governing elites, foreign policy becomes a crucial means of giving 
explicit content to the emerging national identity (‘us’ versus ‘them’) 
through public statements as to the sources of regime legitimacy, 
declarations of intent, and ultimately through the pursuit of a diplomacy of 
isolation, alignment and rejection or confrontation in relation to the 
prevailing international order.94   
 
This thesis makes a distinction between the construction of national identities and the 
construction of international identities by focusing on the purpose of the project.  
National identities95 are domestic projects that are formed with the purpose of 
                                                 
92 Alden, Chris, and Cristina Alves. "History & Identity in the Construction of China's Africa 
Policy." Review of African Political Economy 35.115 (2008): 43-58. Print.   
 
93 See Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. London: Verso, 1991. Print. 
 
94 Alden and Ives, pg. 45 
 
95 There are competing configurations of what constitutes national identity in nation states.  Gary Baines 
draws a distinction between civic national identity and ethnic national identity as means to mobilize 
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congregating a political base in order to strengthen a particular political group within a 
nation.  International identities are projects that construct a national identity in relation to 
other nations with the intention of advancing the nation’s foreign policy aims through the 
projected identity.  Despite the separate definitions of these two projects, the two 
identities are constantly overlapping due to their most common building material, 
namely, the forces of history. Furthermore, to complicate matters, the international 
identity can serve the dual purpose of satisfying or strengthening a domestic political 
base’s identity while at the same time enabling the aims of the state’s foreign policy.96  
 
The aim of this chapter is to show the transition in South Africa’s international 
identity in the post-apartheid era and the historical linkages that have accompanied this 
international identity.  We will see that history’s role as a building tool in national 
identity97 and international identity projects carries historical precedence in South Africa 
through a brief discussion of the role of history in the development of early Afrikaner 
nationalism.  This will be followed by a comparison with the African National Congress 
and the role which history has played, especially as a means of leadership 
                                                                                                                                                             
people behind a vision of the ‘nation’.  Civic nationalism fosters loyalty to a political community, usually 
the nation-state, whereas ethnic nationalism emphasizes the common descent or affinities of people with 
respect to language and religion.   See, Gary Baines, ‘The rainbow nation? Identity and nation-building in 
post-apartheid South Africa’, 
 Mots Pluriels, 7 (1998), 
http://motspluriels.arts.uwa.edu.au/MP798gb.html 
 
96The idea of American exceptionalism is an example in the United States of a dual national and 
international identity.  Deborah Madsen traces the development of American exceptionalism from the time 
of the Puritans through to the post World War II era showing the interplay between a domestic idea that 
has impacted America’s international identity as well.  See Madsen, Deborah L. American 
Exceptionalism. Jackson: University of Mississippi, 1998. Print. 
 
97 Margaret MacMillan’s book The Uses and Abuses of History, was very useful as a departure point for 
this chapter, especially her chapters on the use of history in identity building and history’s role in 
nationalism.  See MacMillan, Margaret. The Uses and Abuses of History. London: Profile, 2009. Print. 
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legitimization.  While both of these studies are domestic examples of history becoming a 
political tool, the task is to highlight how history is a political affair in South Africa 
whether it is being mobilized for domestic or international usage.  The second half of 
this chapter will study two identity projects that have become important to building South 
Africa’s international identity in the post-apartheid era: the ‘Africanization’ of South 
Africa’s international image, and secondly, identifying as part of the Global South or 
‘southernization’.  The chapter will conclude by examining the role of history as a 
diplomatic tool in South Africa’s relations with the United States and China. 
 
3.2 History in Afrikaner Nationalism  
Writing in his 1961 book, The Awakening of Afrikaner Nationalism 1868-188198, 
F. A. Van Jaarsveld identified three factors99 in particular that played a significant role in 
the development of the Afrikaner nation (volk).  The first was the trade policy of the 
Dutch East India Company.  The second was the spiritual heritage of the Dutch 
colonists through Calvinist doctrines. The third was geography--specifically the 
detachment, separation, and development of a frontier life.  Later in the book, Van 
Jaarsveld identified history as a fourth factor in the forging of an Afrikaner nation.  He 
pointed out that there was a reciprocal relationship between the development of the 
Afrikaans language and the development of a distinct Afrikaner history.  During the 
1870s, the project of solidifying the language beyond mere “kitchen Dutch”,  was made 
in earnest with the formation of the Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners (Society of True 
                                                 
98 Albertus, Van Jaarsveld Floris. The Awakening of Afrikaner Nationalism: 1868-1881. Cape Town: 
Human & Rousseau, 1961. Print. 
 
99 Ibid, 9 
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Afrikaners) in 1875, and in the following year with the publication of the Die Patriot (The 
Patriot).  The Society’s purpose was “to stand up for our Language, our Nation and our 
Land”.100  That same year Arnoldus Pannevis wrote the “national anthem”, and the 
words reflected how early mobilising Afrikaners were beginning to think of themselves 
as a national unit. 
’n Ieder nasie het sijn land, 
Ons woon op Afikaanse strand, 
Vero ns is daar geen beter grond 
Op al die wye wereldrond. 
Trots is ons om die naam te dra 
Van kinders van Suid-Afrika. 
 
Every nation has its country, 
We live on Afrikaans soil, 
For us there is no better land 
In all the wide world.  
Proud we are to bear the name  
Of children of South Africa.101 
 
The formation of a distinct Afrikaner identity, separate from their Dutch ancestors 
geographically and now linguistically, in turn led to a discovery of their own history.  At 
first, this historical awakening took place separately amongst the Afrikaners, with the 
Free State Afrikaners, the Cape Afrikaners, and the Transvaal Afrikaners all discovering 
their history independently of each other.  Van Jaarsveld suggested that before this 
historical awakening they had lived as a people without history, existing only in the 
present.  By discovering a history that was Afrikaner, the subsequent step to 
discovering an Afrikaner nation was actually quite short.  Van Jaarsveld illustrated the 
relationship between language, history and national consciousness in the following 
excerpt from The Awakening of Afrikaner Nationalism:  
                                                 
100 Quoted in, Van Jaarsveld, 112 
 
101 Ibid, 114 
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The national consciousness, which, on the one hand, led to the discovery 
of their own language, led, on the other, to the discovery of their own 
history—to the language because it had to do with their nationality in the 
present and in the future, and to their history because it had to answer 
questions on their origin, background and destiny. Their history was to 
form the background for the language or nationality, because the self-
assertive group did not live in the present only; their consciousness of 
their existence stretched over the past as well. In order to arouse the 
people’s national consciousness it was necessary to make them 
historically conscious. The cultivation of historical consciousness would 
perforce also bring about national self-consciousness. The one pre-
supposed the other.102   
 
History, therefore, became a binding force in the development of Afrikaner nationalism, 
as was evident in the importance and mythologizing of events like the Great Trek, and 
the Battle of Blood River.103 Or, a version of history became an anchor to which the idea 
of a single nation could be firmly attached. Indeed, the very writing of history became an 
exercise in nationalism, asserted Van Jaarsveld:  “the writing of history itself, which was 
inspired by nationalism, was to be a defensive art: the nation should be defended 
against attacks, and the faults of the other side exposed. History had to defend104 and 
justify the national existence.”105  In this way, history became very much an exercise in 
instructing the present and thus a political affair. Van Jaarsveld wrote that, “the struggle 
of the past was the struggle of the present, and the struggle of the present the same as 
                                                 
102 Van Jaarsveld, 114 
 
103 See Leonard Thompson’s seminal work The Political Mythology of Apartheid. New Haven: Yale UP, 
1985. Print. 
 
104 In the same way that the Afrikaners and the National Party regime promoted history as a defensive 
exercise in defending the nation, so too did the resistance movements promote history as a means of 
attacking the regime.  Norman Etherington notes that “history [in South Africa] in the 1970s and 1980s 
became the master tool of intellectual resistance to apartheid.”  Quoted in Bundy, Colin. "New Nation New 
History? Constructing the Past in Post-Apartheid South Africa." History Making and Present Day Politics: 
The Meaning of Collective Memory in South Africa. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainsttutet, 2007. 79-81. Print. 
 
105 Van Jaarsveld, 224.   
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that of the past.”106  In the next section we will see that history has continued to play a 
central role to the current politics of South Africa, as we look specifically at the role 
history plays under the governance of the African National Congress. 
 
3.3 The ANC and the Quest for a ‘Usable’ History 
History has become an important element of ANC ideology and political rhetoric 
in the post-apartheid era.  Unlike the Afrikaners, the ANC have not “discovered” history 
nor has it led to an “awakening” or a nationalist movement107, but like the Afrikaners and 
the National Party, history has become a mobilization tool and a means of justifying 
governance.  Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, former leader of the Progressive Federal Party 
from 1979 to 1986, in his book The Other Side of History, pointed out that “inventing 
history” has continuity in South Africa’s political history.  In his own words, “One thing 
the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ South Africa have in common is a passion for inventing history. 
History is not seen as a dispassionate inquiry into what happened, but rather as a part 
of political mobilisation, promoting some form of collective self-interest.”108  He asserted 
that by “inventing history” politicians are able to secure the future.  What Van Zyl 
Slabbert referred to as “inventing history”, could also be referred to as political 
                                                 
106 Van Jaarsveld, 224. 
 
107 The ANC as a whole, is not a nationalist movement, but there are groups within the ANC that have 
nationalist tendencies.  Through his research, William Gumede shows that throughout its 100 year 
history, there have been two distinct Zulu nationalist factions that have competed with each other for 
dominance within the ANC structure.  The one strand being a conservative and more fundamentalist 
nationalist movement, and the other strand more inclusive and less hardline.  Both strands venerate the 
history of the Zulu nation and especially the Zulu King, King Shaka.  See Gumede, William. "Zuma and 
Zulu Nationalism." Pambazuka. Web. 04 Feb. 2014. <http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/85841>. 
 
108 Slabbert, F. Van Zyl. The Other Side of History: An Anecdotal Reflection on Political Transition in 
South Africa. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2006. Print. 
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mythology. Leonard Thompson’s definition of a political myth given in his book, The 
Political Mythology of Apartheid, also holds validity regarding the ANC’s propagation of 
historical myths for political means.  A political myth is “a tale told about the past to 
legitimize or discredit a regime.”109  A collection of these myths becomes a political 
mythology in which they “reinforce one another and jointly constitute the historical 
element of the regime or its rival”110.  By seizing on certain historical elements, the ANC 
has suppressed other histories to legitimize its rule.  There is, then, a direct relationship 
between the construction of political myths and the maintenance of power. In Walter 
Hixson’s description of the relationship, “Myth produces a usable past while at the same 
time empowering certain groups within society at the expense of others. This 
relationship between myth and power explains why a mythical past must be policed and 
reaffirmed.”111  Perhaps some would prefer the term “curated” instead of “policed”, 
however there is no doubt that to construct a political mythology as the National Party 
did or as the ANC have, one has to be selective with the history chosen to be written.  
Typically, the historian, Stephen Ellis, has been critical of the ANC’s selective history 
making and what he claims to be a systematic suppression of South Africa’s past.112  
Ellis cites the ANC’s relationship with the South African Communist Party (SACP) as an 
example of the ANC constructing a political myth for the purpose of maintaining power 
                                                 
109 Thompson, Leonard Monteath. The Political Mythology of Apartheid. New Haven: Yale UP, 1985. 1. 
Print. 
 
110 Thompson, 2 
 
111 Hixson, Walter L. The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy. New 
Haven: Yale UP, 2008. 11. Print. 
 
112 Ellis, Stephen. "ANC Suppresses Real History to Boost Its Claim to Legitimacy."Mail&Guardian 3 Jan. 
2014: Print. 
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and legitimacy.  At the time of Nelson Mandela’s imprisonment in 1962, he was a joint 
member of the ANC as well as the SACP, and not just of the party, but of the SACP 
central committee.  Both the ANC and the SACP have been guarded on the details of 
Mandela’s relationship with the SACP, and it was only recently that they were willing to 
admit he had been a member.113 Furthermore, Mandela’s membership of the SACP 
central committee made him one of the few black members, as the SACP was, at the 
time, largely controlled by whites.  Ellis draws the conclusion that one of the ANC’s key 
documents, the 1955 Freedom Charter, was written by white communists.114  This fact 
strikes a hard blow to the ANC’s meticulously cultivated freedom fighter image, an 
image that seeks to project black liberation fighters, not whites.  This liberation fighter 
image is important to the ANC’s legitimacy and goes a long way towards explaining its 
suppression of historical criticisms of the movement. Ellis details the method of ANC 
history suppression and myth cultivation, observing: 
It [the ANC] constantly invokes the history of militancy that justifies its 
tenure of power as the organization that liberated South Africa.  It 
propagates what one writer calls a ‘battle-centric’ view of the struggle in 
which a special place is allotted to Cuito Cuanavale as the point at which 
apartheid was defeated.  This is  a fantasy or a delusion.  A myth 
concerning the armed struggle has percolated  throughout black South 
Africa. In conformity with the myth that has grown up  around the history 
of opposition to apartheid, the claim to have participated in the armed 
struggle gives people ‘the power to activate certain claims in the 
present’.115 
 
                                                 
113 On December 6, 2013, the day of Mandela’s death the SACP made a formal announcement for the 
first time recognizing that he had been a member of the SACP and at the time of his imprisonment in 
1962 a member of their central committee. See Mashilo, Alex. "Nelson Mandela Was a Member of Our 
CC at the Time of His Arrest - SACP." Politics Web 6 Dec. 2013.  
 
114 Ellis, Stephen. "ANC Suppresses Real History to Boost Its Claim to Legitimacy."Mail&Guardian 3 Jan. 
2014: Print. 
 
115 Ellis, Stephen. External Mission the ANC in Exile, 1960-1990. London: Hurst, 2012. 296. Print. 
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Ellis’ description fits Walter Hixson’s theory on the direct relationship between power 
and myth in politics.  The years of exile for the ANC have taken on a mythology of their 
own, with many “liberation fighters”, who in reality saw little to no battle, using the past 
to bolster their current claim to power.  The liberation image is a component of the 
ANC’s larger historical myth concerning the founding of the “new” South Africa.  The 
myth propagates a vision that apartheid was defeated largely as a result of the ANC’s 
armed struggle.  While the armed struggle was a factor in the fall of apartheid, it is a 
gross simplification to reduce it to being the sole factor.  Furthermore, it leaves out far 
more influential causes like the international isolation of South Africa and the end of the 
Cold War. As Stephen Ellis contextualizes the place of the armed struggle, “the decision 
of Chase Manhattan Bank in 1985 not to roll over a loan was probably of more 
consequence than the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, even though it hardly figures in the 
new official history.”116 It is this international context that is virtually ignored in the ANC’s 
narrative of the end of apartheid. The dramatic changes in the international order at the 
end of the 1980s and early 1990s had a far greater effect on the end of the apartheid 
state than the ANC would like to think.  These complicated dimensions do not neatly 
conform to the founding myth, nor do they serve to reinforce the ANC’s legitimacy to 




                                                 
116 Ellis, Stephen. External Mission the ANC in Exile, 1960-1990. London: Hurst, 2012. 301. Print. 
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3.4 ‘Africanizing’ and ‘Southernizing’ South Africa’s International 
Identity 
Since 1990, South Africa has undergone a dramatic and deliberate shift in 
international identity.  Long a pariah in most international settings and forums, South 
Africa has sought to throw off this mantle by cultivating a number of new identities 
through its foreign policy.117  In the early years of the ANC government, it was difficult to 
discern just what tack South Africa wanted to take with its foreign policy.  As Peter Vale 
observed in 1995, “as in many areas of its emerging personality, South Africa's "new" 
foreign policy suffers from a crisis of multiple identities.”118  Garth le Pere explained the 
confusion by connecting South Africa’s discomfort in finding a domestic national identity 
and with finding its place in the international arena.119 Still, twenty years on, South 
Africa has gained some footing in its quest to find a foreign policy identity: here, two 
themes or identities in particular have emerged. The first identity is as an African leader 
and the voice of Africa; the second is as a developing nation from the global south.120   
                                                 
117 Foreign Policy is one of the common ways in which countries express their international identity.  On 
the relationship between South Africa’s foreign policy and its international identity see Cilliers, J., “An 
Emerging South African Foreign Policy Identity?” ICS Occasional Paper, April 1999 
 
118 Vale, Peter. "Prisoner of the Past?: The New South Africa Abroad." Southern Africa Report 5th ser. 10 
(1995): 10. Print. 
 
119 Le Pere, Garth. "Globalisation and National Identity Construction: Nation Building in South Africa." 
Identity? Theory, Politics, History. Ed. S. B. Bekker and Rachel Prinsloo. Pretoria: Human Sciences 
Research Council, 1999. 11. Print. 
 
120 There are layers and subtleties to this second identity project.  Identifying as a “middle power” is an 
additional component to the identity of South Africa’s as a developing nation of the global south project.  
Within this context South Africa identifies as an “emerging middle power”, a term that compliments its 
status as an emerging market.  Professor Maxi Schoeman notes that there are many ambiguities 
surrounding the term “emerging middle power”, but that a defining characteristic of South Africa’s post-
apartheid foreign policy has been its preference for multilateral international institutions, a feature of many 
middle power states.  For more on South Africa as a middle power see Schoeman, Prof Maxi. "South 
Africa as an Emerging Middle Power." African Security Review 9.3 (2000): 47-58. 
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These identities are historically informed and, in the same way that the ANC’s 
legitimacy is bolstered through its historical interpretation and narrative of the struggle 
against apartheid, so, too, are these two identities connected to an interpretation of 
South Africa’s past.  
 
 
3.4.1 Africanizing South Africa’s Foreign Policy 
The transformative global events of the early 1990s with the collapse of the 
Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union left the ANC scrambling to play catch 
up with its foreign policy, and no doubt contributed to the crisis of multiple international 
identities.  As the political negotiations started in the early 1990s, the ANC came under 
increasing pressure to outline its foreign policy.  The world was eager to know what role 
the ANC envisioned for South Africa on the world stage after decades of imposed 
isolation.  The influential magazine, Foreign Affairs, gave Mandela the opportunity to 
outline the “new” foreign policy for the “new” South Africa in 1993.121 Mandela made it 
clear that the first priority of an ANC led government would be the servicing of domestic 
needs and that the government’s foreign policy would be formulated with this in mind.  
Above all, human rights would serve as the policy guide both domestically and 
internationally.  In his own words, “issues of human rights are central to international 
relations and an understanding that they extend beyond the political, embracing the 
economic, social and environmental.”122  In terms of geographic priorities, Mandela was 
                                                 
121 Mandela, Nelson. "The New South Africa's Future Foreign Policy." Foreign Affairs 72.5 (1993): 85-89. 
Print 
 
122 Ibid, 87. 
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clear that an ANC government would be African-focused in its identity orientation and 
foreign policies.  In this way, it seems that Mandela was at pains to distance himself 
from the National Party and what many regarded as a euro-centric foreign policy.  The 
message was simple, South Africa was an African nation, and had a role to play in 
Africa’s affairs:    
South Africa cannot escape its African destiny. If we do not devote our 
energies to this continent, we too could fall victim to the forces that have 
brought ruin to its various parts. [...]Southern Africa commands a special 
priority in our foreign policy. We are inextricably part of southern Africa 
and our destiny is linked to that of a region, which is much more than a 
mere geographical concept.123 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the Mandela presidency’s foreign policy was largely 
consumed with the normalisation of South Africa’s foreign relations.  Mandela 
succeeded in establishing a worldwide diplomatic presence and in bringing South Africa 
back into the fold in international multilateral organizations like the United Nations (UN), 
the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the European Union (EU), as well as a number 
of other organizations.  When Mbeki took over the presidency in 1999, South Africa’s 
“new” foreign policy was still very much in its formative phase.  Under Mbeki, South 
Africa’s foreign policy identity and identification became more focused.  Gerrit Olivier 
points out that at first the foreign policy changes between the Mandela presidency and 
the Mbeki presidency were almost imperceptible and seamless, but later it developed 
into something profound.124  The primacy of Africa to South Africa’s foreign policy first 
heralded by Mandela finally took centre stage, at least rhetorically.  The rhetoric 
                                                 
123 Mandela, Nelson. "The New South Africa's Future Foreign Policy." Foreign Affairs 72.5 (1993): 87. 
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reflected first and foremost South Africa’s new African personality, declared Olivier, “Its 
essential Afrocentric character and purpose; its role and destiny as a leading nation in 
Africa, and a primary role-player in the Global South.”125  Mbeki’s African theme was 
first introduced in his famous “I Am an African” speech.126  Delivered in 1996 while still 
Vice President on behalf of the ANC on the occasion of the passing of the new South 
African constitution, the speech sought to knit together the various histories of South 
Africa and how these peoples and histories had influenced Mbeki in becoming an 
African.  It was Mbeki’s promotion of an “African Renaissance” that encapsulated the 
focus and international identity of his government.127  In some respects, the African 
Renaissance was a catch-all term for Africa moving forward, but Mbeki outlined the 
essential elements as being social cohesion, democracy, economic rebuilding and 
growth, and the establishment of Africa as a significant player in geo-political affairs.  In 
his own words; 
[t]he raison d'être for an African renaissance in the African continent is the 
need  to  empower African peoples to deliver themselves from the legacy 
of colonialism and neo-colonialism and to situate themselves on the global 
stage as equal and  respected contributors to, as well as beneficiaries of 
all the achievements of human civilization.  Just as the continent was once 
the cradle of humanity and an important contributor to civilization, this 
renaissance should empower it to help the world rediscover the oneness 
of the human race.  One of the most fundamental elements which 
constitutes the content of this renewal is the construction of a growing and 
sustainable economy capable of assimilating the best characteristics, 
                                                 
125 Olivier, Gerrit. "South Africa's Foreign Policy towards the Global North." South African Foreign Policy 
Review. Ed. Christopher Landsberg and Jo-Ansie Van. Wyk. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 
2012. 176. Print. 
 
126 Debates of the Constitutional Assembly, no. 1, 29 March-8May 1996. 422-427. Print.  
 
127 Peter Vale makes note that Mbeki's usage of the term was not original.  In 1969 Victor Gallencez wrote 
a book using the title and the African historian Basil Davidson, during an interview in 1997 suggested that 
“an African Renaissance has dawned”.  However, it was Mbeki who popularized the term and brought it 
into the mainstream parlance.  See Vale, Peter, and Sipho Maseko. "South Africa and the African 
Renaissance." International Affairs 74.2 (1998): 271-87. Print. 
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contribute to and take advantage of the real flows of economic activities 
around the world.128    
 
The vision of an African Renaissance had the gloss of pan-Africanism, but it was clear 
that Mbeki envisioned South Africa leading the renaissance. Notably, Moeletsi Mbeki, 
the younger brother of Thabo Mbeki, recalls that towards the end of 1997 the African 
Renaissance began to be referred to as South Africa’s foreign policy.   At the ANC’s 
December 1997 national conference, a discussion document was released, entitled 
“Developing a Strategic Perspective on South African Foreign Policy”.  The African 
Renaissance was referred to as “the main pillar of our international policy not only 
relating to Africa but in all our international relations globally.”129 
 
Under Mbeki’s presidency, the idea of Africanizing South Africa’s identity and 
foreign policy became entrenched.  One former speechwriter in the President’s Office 
during the Mbeki presidency described how they [the speechwriters and public 
spokespersons] were given instructions on how to relate “everything” in the speeches 
back to Africa, especially in matters concerning foreign policy.  Speechwriters were also 
instructed to frame South Africa in their speeches as “an African nation”.  “It was clear 
that there was an Africanization project going on, and that it was being directed from the 
very top of government.”130   
                                                 
 
128 “The African Renaissance: South Africa and the World,” address of Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, 
April 9, 1998, at the United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan. 
 
129 Quoted by Moeletsi Mbeki in Mbeki, Moeletsi. "The African Renaissance." Souls 2.2 (2000): 76-81. 
Print. 
130 "Anonymous Interview with Former Speech Writer in the President's Office." Personal interview. 5 
June 2013. Stellenbosch 
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In this next section, we will see how Africa continues to feature prominently in the 
international identity of South Africa, but with the added nuance of ‘southernization’.   
 
3.4.2 ‘Southernizing’ South Africa’s Foreign Policy 
In 2011, the South African Government released a white paper on its foreign 
policy.  The paper contained a section on the two main international identities of South 
Africa and the way in which South Africa’s liberation history has informed these 
identities:   
In terms of South Africa’s liberation history, its evolving international 
engagement  is based on two central tenets, namely: Pan-Africanism and 
South-South  solidarity. South Africa recognises itself as an integral part of 
the African continent and therefore understands its national interest as 
being intrinsically linked to Africa’s stability, unity, and prosperity. 
Likewise, the 1955 Bandung Conference shapes our understanding of 
South-South cooperation and opposition to colonialism as a natural 
extension of our national interest.131 
  
South-South cooperation traces its roots to the 1955 Bandung, Africa Asia conference.  
The conference aims were to promote collaboration and cooperation between Africa 
and Asia, and to oppose any form of colonialism or neo-colonialism.  The conference in 
turn laid the foundation for the beginnings of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM).   NAM 
was a response to the polarisation that the Cold War had created.132  Members sought 
a “third way” of non-alignment.  Even with the end of the Cold War, the group has 
remained a force in South-South cooperation, with South Africa’s Department of 
                                                 
131 South Africa. Department of International Relations and Cooperation. Building a Better World: The 
Diplomacy of Ubuntu. White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy. Pretoria: 10, 2011. Print. 
 
132 For further information on the formation and early objectives of the Non Aligned Movement see 
Willetts, Peter. The Non-aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance. London: F. Pinter, 
1978. Print. 
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International Relations and Cooperation in its 2011-2014 Strategic Plan labeling NAM 
as the “flag ship of the South”.133  South Africa’s liberation movements participated as 
observers in the Non Aligned Movement from its outset in 1961, and in 1994 South 
Africa became an official member.134  South Africa’s involvement and participation in the 
Non-Aligned Movement complements and bolsters its identity as a member of both the 
developing world and of the Global South.   
 
Even though South Africa is by far the most industrialized and developed country 
on the African continent135, it sees itself as having more in common with the developing 
nations of the Global South.  The twin concepts of identifying as a developing nation 
and at the same time as part of the global south are almost inseparable for this aspect 
of South Africa’s identity.  In recent years, South Africa’s southernization identity 
building has been focused on a new forum; in 2010 South Africa was invited to join the 
BRIC political bloc.  The BRIC acronym was first coined in 2001 paper by Goldman 
Sachs economist, Jim O’Neill, referring to the economies of Brazil, Russia, India and 
China.136  The paper became the inspiration for the foreign ministers of each respective 
country to hold an informal meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in 
                                                 
133 South Africa. Department of International Relations and Cooperation. Strategic Plan 2011-2014.  
http://www.dirco.gov.za/department/strategicplan%202011-2014/strategic%20plan%202011.pdf 
 
134 "Non-Aligned Movement: History and Present Status." http://www.dfa.gov.za/. 1 Dec. 2006. Web. 18 
Jan. 2014. 
 
135 South Africa boasts the most developed and diversified economy on the African continent, with an 
advanced financial services industry, heavy infrastructure, and a per capita GDP that in 2011 stood at 
$8,078 USD.  Despite these impressive figures, South Africa suffers from many of the problems that 
plague other members of the developing world; namely high unemployment and inequality.   
 
136 Jim O‟Neill, “Building Better Global Economic BRICs”, Goldman Sachs Global Economic Paper No. 
66, November 2001. Print.  
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September 2006.  In 2009, an official summit was held along with the creation of an 
official BRIC bloc.  South Africa immediately showed interest in joining the BRIC bloc, 
and in 2010 lobbied each member state.  South Africa argued that a political bloc 
focused on the agenda of the Global South needed at least one African voice.  The idea 
was that South Africa would  be representing not just itself on the forum, but the rest of 
the continent as well.  President Jacob Zuma while on a visit to China in 2010 to lobby 
for a spot in the group, asserted, “participation in BRIC would mean that an entire 
continent that has a population of over 1 billion people is represented.”137  The BRIC 
forum fulfills both South Africa’s African identity and Southern identity by providing a 
venue for South Africa to parade its African leadership while being in the company of 
the world’s leading developing economies.  
South Africa has sought to find a usable history to justify its inclusion138 in the BRICS 
bloc and to portray the group as being an historic continuation of the spirit of the 
Bandung conference and the Non-Aligned Movement.  Minister of International 
Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, speaking at the 2013 BRICS 
forum in South Africa, asserted: 
BRICS is a continuation of the tradition that was firmly established 57 
years ago, in April 1955, when countries of Asia and Africa met at the 
historic Bandung Conference to galvanise their collective muscle in the 
context of the Cold War and assert themselves in the international system. 
The Bandung Conference, which led to the formation of the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM), was a historic  watershed in the international relations 
of developing countries. South Africa was at the Bandung Conference, 
                                                 
137 "South Africa Wants to Join So-called BRIC Nations."http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/. 26 Aug. 
2010. Web. 17 Feb. 2014.  
 
138 South Africa has by far the smallest economy and population of the BRICS bloc and its inclusion has 
prompted some to ask what it really has in common with the other members.  See The Economist, May 
29, 2013 as well as Jim O’Neill’s comments, the founder of the BRIC acronym in Naidoo, Sharda. "South 
Africa's Presence 'drags down Brics'" Mail and Guardian 23 Mar. 2012: Print. 
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represented through the African National Congress.  The present context 
of international relations and cooperation between Asian, African and Latin 
American countries – collectively known as countries of the South – 
remains critical, and has become more important than ever before.139 
 
Since it officially joined the BRICS club at the beginning of 2011, South Africa 
has continued140 this theme of African leadership and representation on the forum, 
standing in stark contrast to the other BRIC members who seek to only represent 
themselves.  Chris Alden and Maxi Schoeman have discerned that woven into South 
Africa’s Africanist’ dialogue and rhetoric is a trace of exceptionalism that sets it apart 
from the rest of the continent – “The notion that South Africa retains a unique status on 
the continent owing to the nature of its political transition and its economic inheritance 
as a middle-income developing country.”141  History is used to reinforce South Africa’s 
unique status as well.  South Africa’s Minister of International Relations and Co-
operation, Nkoana-Mashabane, explains that the overarching purpose of BRICS is to 
reform the architecture of the global system.  In an Op-ed released before the 2014 
BRICS summit, Nkoana-Mashabane pointed out that South Africa’s inclusion in the 
reform process carries historical continuity, arguing: 
The old South Africa played a not-insignificant part in the creation of the 
old global hierarchy. It is only fitting that on the 20th anniversary of our 
democracy, we and our partners should today be laying the foundations of 
a new, more truly representative international order.142 
                                                 
139 Nkoana-Mashabane, Maite. "Letter from the Minister." Ubuntu: Diplomacy in Action Apr. 2013: 6-7. 
Print. 
 
140 President Jacob Zuma, speaking to the World Economic Forum in May 2013 declared that "The 
membership of South Africa in BRICS represents the 1-billion people in the continent of Africa."  See 
"Zuma Banking on Africa Hosting Brics’ New Development Lender." Business Day LIVE. 10 May 2013. 
Web. 21 Mar. 2014. 
 
141 Alden, Chris, and Maxi Schoeman. "South Africa in the Company of Giants: The Search for Leadership 
in a Transforming Global Order." International Affairs 89.1 (2013): 111-29. Print. 
 
142 Nkoana-Mashabane, Maite. "Brics to Reform the Global Architecture." The Sunday Independent 
(South Africa). N.p., 13 July 2014. Web. 15 July 2014. 




The statement was a rare nod towards South Africa’s former Prime Minister, Jan Smuts, 
who played a part in both the Bretton Woods conference of 1944, as well as in the 
earlier founding of the League of Nations.  By invoking this heritage, South Africa seeks 
to show that it has long played a role in international leadership and world order 
building. 
Leadership, and the quest for leadership recognition on the African continent, is 
what unites South Africa’s two main international identities.  In this regard, there are 
historical continuities with previous South African governments and regimes.  Peter Vale 
notes that South Africa’s leaders have long held the belief that the country holds a 
leadership destiny in Africa: 
The notion that their [South Africa’s] presence should feature in African 
affairs seems to have been a constant thread in the rhetoric of successive 
South African leaders, irrespective of colour or ideological hue.  Each 
epoch has appeared to offer exciting possibilities of engagement across 
the continent’s special divides.143 
 
This destiny has expressed itself most acutely in South Africa’s foreign policy, which 
Alden and Schoeman have correctly identified as having the overarching aim of being 
recognized as Africa’s leading state, a continuity guiding the foreign policy of the 
governments of Smuts, Vorster, Mandela, and Mbeki.144   
                                                 
143 Vale, Peter, and Sipho Maseko. "South Africa and the African Renaissance."International Affairs 74.2 
(1998): 271-87. Print. 
 
144 Alden, Chris, and Maxi Schoeman. "South Africa in the Company of Giants: The Search for Leadership 
in a Transforming Global Order." International Affairs 89.1 (2013): 111-29. Print. 
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Our next section explores the use of history in South Africa’s relations with the 
United States and China.  We will see that there is a direct relationship between 
international identity and using history as a diplomatic tool.   
 
3.5 History as a Diplomatic Tool in US - South African Relations 
The use of history has long been an important diplomatic tool in the US-South 
African relationship. One former US diplomat, who served in South Africa during the 
political transition, summarized the importance of history to the relationship as simply 
being one of the easiest ways to find something in common.  “The essence of 
diplomacy is finding and working on what you have in common, and if you don’t have 
something in common, then you build it.”145  The United States in particular has been 
active in its attempts at “building” with history, something that has been a mainstay in 
the relationship since the 1960s.  Interestingly – as well as unusually - the use of history 
as a diplomatic tool in the US South African relationship has continuities in both the 
Apartheid and post-Apartheid eras.   
 
Perhaps the most famous example of this bridge building technique was Senator 
Robert Kennedy’s June 1966 visit to South Africa.  This visit remains one of the most 
important visits by an American to South Africa.  Robert Kennedy’s visit came at a time 
of increasing global isolation for Hendrik Verwoerd’s government, with Nelson Mandela, 
and other opposition members in prison on Robben Island for already two years.  The 
senator visited and spoke to students at the University of Cape Town, the University of 
                                                 
145 "Anonymous Interview with Former US Diplomat." Personal interview. 12 Nov. 2012. Cape Town 
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Stellenbosch146, the University of Witwatersrand, and the University of Natal.  
Kennedy’s speech at the University of Cape Town is considered by some to have been 
the greatest speech of his career, with one paragraph in particular on the “ripple of 
hope” becoming an oft-quoted idea in subsequent American political rhetoric.  For our 
study, this speech is important for the precedent it set in American engagement with 
South Africa.147  Kennedy painted America as having a similar history and 
developmental path to that of South Africa, especially with regards to issues of race.  
The following quote illustrates his comparative approach:   
I came here because of my deep interest and affection for a land settled 
by the Dutch in the mid-seventeenth century, then taken over by the 
British, and at last independent; a land in which the native inhabitants 
were at first subdued, but relations with whom remain a problem to this 
day; a land which defined itself on a hostile frontier; a land which has 
tamed rich natural resources through the energetic application of modern 
technology; a land which once imported slaves, and now must struggle to 
wipe out the last traces of that former bondage. I refer, of course, to the 
United States of America.148 
 
Kennedy built a diplomatic bridge by using a comparative history of South Africa and the 
United States.  Both nations had Dutch colonies, and fought a war for independence 
against the British, and both nations had a history of tense, and often violent race 
relations.  Already, there existed in America at that time a sense of solidarity, especially 
                                                 
146 It is interesting to note that Senator Kennedy’s visit to the University of Stellenbosch was at the 
invitation of the Simonsberg’s Men’s Residence.  The invitation was strongly criticized by the 
administration of the university, but allowed to proceed.  The visit was important to Kennedy as he 
recognized it to be the premier Afrikaans university and a way of engaging with the Afrikaner community 
despite the government’s open rejection of any meeting with him.  See RFK In The Land Of Apartheid. 
Prod. Larry Shore. Dir. Tami Gold. Shoreline Productions, 2009. DVD. 
 
147 In President Obama’s June 2013 visit to South Africa, he made a speech at the University of Cape 




148 "Robert F. Kennedy Speeches." - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum. Web. 10 Nov. 
2013  http://www.jfklibrary.org/ 
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amongst the African American community, with South Africa’s race struggles.149  In 
1962, Chief Albert Luthuli and Martin Luther King Jr. issued a joint statement to “Appeal 
for Action against Apartheid”.150  This solidarity was reaffirmed, decades later, in 1990 
when Nelson Mandela made his first visit to America and, speaking to a crowd in 
Harlem, declared that the African National Congress had followed the civil rights 
movement in America for over thirty years.  Mandela spoke, saying, “There is an 
unbreakable umbilical cord connecting black South Africans and black Americans, for 
we are together, Children of Africa.”151  This relationship and the resulting empathy is 
alleged to have inspired a young Barack Obama to become active in politics.  While still 
a Senator, Obama made a visit to Cape Town in 2006 and delivered a speech on the 
common issues that America and South Africa faced, opening with a short personal 
biography on South Africa’s influence in his career. 
When I was in college, there was one issue that moved me for the first 
time in my life to become politically active and play a leadership role in my 
community.  The issue was apartheid.  And, as a young college student, I 
became deeply involved with the divestment movement in the United 
States.  I remember meeting with a group of ANC leaders, hearing the 
stories of their struggles for freedom and their leader Nelson Mandela.  
We [Americans] have been inspired by the struggles in other nations that 
have, in turn, helped shape and perfect the very freedoms and rights held 
                                                 
149 There have been links between black South Africans and black Americans for more than a century and 
a half.  In the 1920s there was an idea that spread amongst black South Africans, that African Americans 
would come and liberate them from racist rule.  See Vinson, Robert Trent. The Americans Are Coming!: 
Dreams of African American Liberation in Segregationist South Africa. Athens: Ohio UP, 2012. Print.   
 
150 See, http://www.rfksafilm.org/html/doc_pdfs/luthuli_king.pdf  For a comprehensive examination of the 
relationship between America’s civil rights movement and South Africa’s liberation movement see Nesbitt, 
Francis Njubi. Race for Sanctions: African Americans against Apartheid, 1946-1994. Bloomington: 
Indiana UP, 2004. Print. 
 
151 Kifner, John. "The Mandela Visit; Mandela Takes His Message to Rally in Yankee Stadium." The New 
York Times. The New York Times, 21 June 1990. 
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dear by citizens of my own country.  The relationship between the United 
States and South Africa is a classic example of this interplay.152   
 
America’s use of history in its diplomacy with South Africa has focused on race issues 
by using a comparative approach between America’s civil rights movement and South 
Africa’s liberation movement.  There is, undoubtedly, a key difference between the two 
movements that is rarely elucidated. America’s blacks were not fighting for liberation, 
they were fighting for equal rights, whereas South Africa’s blacks were fighting for 
complete and total emancipation with the ultimate goal of taking government.153 But a 
key feature of history usage in diplomacy is, of course, its sweeping and vague nature.  
United States Consul General to Cape Town, Erica Barks-Ruggles, in a 2012 speech 
illustrated this: 
Our histories are similar in so many ways--some inspiring and some 
painful.  In part because of this history, our two multicultural democracies 
grapple with very similar issues….[a] shared history of struggle and 
continuing search for equality is one important reason that we share so 
many common challenges and common  goals.154 
 
In the United States-South African relationship, it is the US that leads in using history as 
a diplomatic tool.  In fact, except for the example of Nelson Mandela’s speech to Harlem 
in 1990, there are no recent examples of South Africa trying to use history to build a 
relationship with the U.S.155  There are two reasons for this: the first is that despite a 
                                                 
152 Obama, Barack. "A Common Humanity Through Common Security." South African Institute for 
International Affairs. Cape Town. 21 Aug. 2006. Speech. 
 
153 For the differences between South Africa’s liberation movement and the United States Civil Rights 
movement see Fredrickson, George M. Black Liberation: A Comparative History of Black Ideologies in the 
United States and South Africa. New York: Oxford UP, 1995. Print. 
 
154 Barks-Ruggles, Erica. "South Africa and the United States: Common Challenges, Common Goals." 
Cape Town. 24 Jan. 2012. Speech. 
 
155 Scott Firsing discovered that there are many black South Africans who take offense to the US 
comparing the civil rights movement and South Africa’s liberation movement, and especially of the US 
African American community taking credit for helping South Africa’s liberation movement.  Firsing, Scott. 
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strong diplomatic relationship between the two countries, an anti-American group exists 
within the ANC.156  The second reason, which is related to the first, is that South Africa’s 
relationship with the US does not conform to its Southern or African identity projects.  
South Africa is sensitive of being seen as merely America’s pawn in Africa or of being 
too close to the “West”.  This would hurt its southern leadership credentials, and its 
relations with BRIC member countries who are also sensitive to American hegemony.  
The next section will show that the use of history in the South African-Chinese 
relationship is much more of a mutual effort. 
 
3.6 History as a Diplomatic Tool in Chinese-South African Relations 
South Africa and China have only held official diplomatic relations since 1998.  
However, a constant invocation in the official discourse between the two is the historic 
nature of the relationship.  South Africa and China do have a long history that stretches 
back to the 17th century,157 although this early history with China is rarely mentioned or 
used in official discourse.  South Africa’s history with mainland China is primarily related 
to the immigration of Chinese to South Africa, with South Africa being home to the 
largest Chinese population in Africa.158  Interestingly, this social history is never invoked 
                                                                                                                                                             
"Assessing Asymmetry in International Politics: US-South Africa Relations: 1994-2008." Phd Thesis. 
University of South Africa, 2011. Print. 
 
156 Ian Glenn has analysed the anti-American rhetoric of the ANC and presents an overview of this group 
within the ANC.  Glenn, Ian. "Cryptic Rhetoric: The ANC and Anti-Americanization." Safundi 9.1 (2008): 
69-79. Print. 
 
157 The first Chinese arrived in the Cape as convicts and exiles during the time of Dutch rule in the 17th 
century. See Yap, Melanie. Colour, Confusion and Concessions: The History of the Chinese in South 
Africa. Hong Kong: Hong Kong UP, 1996. Print.   
 
158 Karen Harris has researched the waves of Chinese immigration to South Africa and identifies three 
distinct immigration patterns beginning in the 17th century with the arrival at the Cape of a very small 
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by either South Africa or China in their discourse. Rather, the tendency is to point to 
historical events from centuries earlier159, and instead of a focused history on China and 
South Africa, sweeping mention is made of China’s engagement with	all of Africa.  Chris 
Alden points out that that the importance is not on the historical details, but in stressing 
the continuities of China’s engagement, as well as in constructing a common history.160  
President Thabo Mbeki, during a speech addressing then Chinese Premier, Wen 
Jiabao, pointed towards the common history that China and South Africa apparently 
shared, declaring, “We are united by the past in which our heroic peoples struggled and 
defeated colonialism and apartheid and have since faced similar challenges confronting 
all developing countries.”161 During the toast, Mbeki focused on the struggle for 
liberation as a common history. During another speech, he went even further, by telling 
the audience that South Africa and China not only had a “shared journey”, but that 
China had apparently provided inspiration to South Africa’s liberation activists:   
                                                                                                                                                             
number of convicts and exiles, as well as a few independent traders and merchants.  This first group was 
quite negligible in size.  The second wave of immigration took place in the first decade of the twentieth 
century after the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand.  Some 63,695 indentured Chinese labourers 
were imported to supplement the labour shortage caused by the recent Boer War.  The third and more 
recent of Chinese immigrants began with the Taiwanese in the late 1970s as South Africa deepened 
relations with the Republic of China (ROC).  Following the end of apartheid, and especially the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China, a flood of mainland Chinese 
immigrants poured into South Africa.  See, Harris, Karen. "Waves of Migration: A Brief Outline of the 
History of Chinese in South Africa." The China Monitor 21 (2007): 4-6. Web. <http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2009/04/ccs-china-monitor-august-07.pdf>.   
 
159 There is little evidence of the Chinese reaching southern Africa prior to the 16th century, though this 
has not stopped many from speculating and even mythologizing the possibility like President Jacob 
Zuma. Karen Harris provides an overview of the historiography as wells as the history of China’s early 
maritime contact with Africa in "Early Encounters between China and Africa: Myth or Moment?" South 
African Journal of Cultural History 17.1 (2003): 47-71. Print. 
 
160 Alden, Chris, and Cristina Alves. "History & Identity in the Construction of China's Africa Policy." 
Review of African Political Economy 35.115 (2008): 43-58. Print. 
 
161 Mbeki, Thabo. "Toast Remarks by President Thabo Mbeki on the Occasion of the Official Dinner in 
Honour of His Excellency, Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China." 
Tuynhuys, Cape Town. 21 June 2006. Web. http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2006/mbek0621.htm  
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Many in my generation remember the days when as young activists of our 
liberation movement we learnt from magazines such as China 
Reconstructs of how you had fought for your own liberation and how you 
were working to build a new life for the great Chinese people. By watching 
such epic films as The East is Red we strengthened our resolve not to 
allow any obstacle to stand in the way of our own struggle to liberate 
ourselves.162  
 
Besides invoking a common history, Mbeki also sought a common identity with 
China through their South-South solidarity.  While speaking at Tsinghua University, 
Mbeki showed the historical continuities in this engagement: 
Together with China, we are commonly defined by our situation as 
belonging to  the South. I think it is fitting to take a moment to reflect on 
the history of our engagement going back many centuries.  For hundreds, 
if not thousands of years, seafarers from South West Asia ventured further 
and further from the mainland in long canoes or rafts fitted with sails, 
outriggers and rudders and control devices that made them more 
seaworthy and manoeuvrable, and in ocean-going vessels with complex 
steering systems and with a seamanship so remarkable that it is said they 
were even able to cross the six-thousand mile expanse of the Indian 
Ocean to settle in Madagascar off the East African Coast.163 
 
Mbeki then went on to discuss historian Louise Levathes’ book. When China Ruled the 
Seas, in which she makes brief mention of ancient Chinese trade with Africa.  Mbeki 
seized on this idea of an ancient relationship between China and Africa, one that 
predated even colonial European ties to the continent. He took a liberal, even romantic, 
interpretation of the strength of the relationship: 
Many ancient kingdoms on the African continent - in Kenya, Tanzania, 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and South Africa - had strong political and 
economic relations with various Asian countries - especially China.  These 
relations were based on equality, friendship, mutual respect and benefit.  
                                                 
162 Mbeki, Thabo. Statement at a Banquet in Honour of President Zemin of the Republic of China. Cape 
Town. 25 Apr. 2000. Web. Http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2000/mbek0425.htm  
 
163 Mbeki, Thabo. "Address at Tsinghua University." China, Beijing. 11 Dec. 2001. Web. 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2001/mbek1211.htm  
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Hence, the King of Malindi in Kenya was able to send a special envoy to 
the Chinese emperor with an important gift of a giraffe.164 
 
Mbeki was clearly at pains to distinguish between China’s interactions with the continent 
and those of the West. By focusing on how the relations were governed by “equality, 
friendship, mutual respect and benefit”, it would be obvious to anyone in the audience 
that he was talking about the way in which colonial relations had been the opposite.   
Relations between China and South Africa have continued to strengthen under 
President Jacob Zuma. Like his predecessor, Zuma has been disposed to using history 
as a form of diplomatic bridge building with China. Characteristically, President Zuma 
displayed this in remarks during an official state visit by China’s President Xi Jing Ping, 
revealing: 
Excellency, historians continue to uncover evidence that the contact 
between Africa and China predates the written record.  It is said that our 
own kingdom of Mapungubwe in Limpopo province, which is now a 
UNESCO World Heritage Site, had contact with China already nine 
centuries ago.  Regrettably, colonialism, imperialism, and apartheid 
disrupted165 contacts.166 
 
Jacob Zuma, like other leaders within the African National Congress, has also been at 
pains to establish a historical link between the ANC and China’s Communist Party 
(CCP).  In the same speech to President Xi Jing Ping, he spoke of the ties between the 
ANC and the CCP:   
                                                 
164 Mbeki, Thabo. "Address at Tsinghua University." China, Beijing. 11 Dec. 2001. Web. 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2001/mbek1211.htm  
165 China’s contact with Africa did not cease because of colonialism, imperialism and apartheid, but 
because of its own domestic politics.  After 1433 Chinese anti-expansionism forced China to withdraw 
from its overseas ambitions and explorations.  See Harris, Karen L. "Early Encounters between China 
and Africa: Myth or Moment?" South African Journal of Cultural History 17.1 (2003): 47-71. Print. 
 
166 Zuma, Jacob. "Remarks by President Zuma on the Occasion of the Official Signing Ceremony during 
the State Visit to South Africa by the President of the People’s Republic of China Mr Xi Jinping." Pretoria. 
26 Mar. 2013. Web. http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=15116  
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I am very proud to say that contact was established in the 1950s, over 
sixty years ago between the African National Congress and the People’s 
Republic of China. It was no less than the late Comrade Walter Sisulu who 
visited China in 1953 to establish ties and garner support for the struggle 
against apartheid.  The People’s Republic of China readily obliged and 
remained steadfast in its opposition to apartheid until the first free and 
democratic election was held in South Africa in 1994.167  
 
The PRC support for the ANC’s fight against apartheid, was in reality quite paltry and 
amounted to little more than rhetorical support.   
 
In 2008, President Zuma proposed to his Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao, that 
the CCP organize training workshops for senior ANC members.168  Zuma’s proposal 
was so that the ANC could “Learn from the CPC on its cadre development and party 
organizational work on the ground.”169 Since 2008, many ANC senior leaders have 
attended training seminars in China on economics, national planning, and political 
structuring.  Crucially, these developments are recent for the ANC and CCP, despite 
leadership comments painting China as an obliging friend and steadfast opponent of 
apartheid. These are an imaginative interpretation of historical events, if not outright 
historical revisionism.   
 
                                                 
167 Zuma, Jacob. "Remarks by President Zuma on the Occasion of the Official Signing Ceremony during 
the State Visit to South Africa by the President of the People’s Republic of China Mr Xi Jinping." Pretoria. 
26 Mar. 2013. Web. http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=15116  
 
168 Weiyun, Zhong. "Inter-party Relations Promote Sino-African Strategic Partnership." China Today. 19 
Oct. 2012. Web. 
 
169 Zuma, Jacob. Speech to the Chinese Executive Leadership Academy. 13 June 2008. Web. 
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=3849 
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Moses Kotane, along with Oliver Tambo and Duma Nokwe made an official visit 
to China in 1963170, but even with China’s insistence that it was staunchly opposed to 
the Apartheid government, there was little material assistance provided to the African 
National Congress.  This was in part due to the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s.  During a 
1983 interview with Oliver Tambo, he described the relationship between the ANC and 
China as being strained by the Sino-Soviet conflict.  Tambo admitted that there was 
minimal contact with China throughout the 1960s, 1970s and the early 1980s due to the 
ANC’s strong association with the Soviet Union.171  
 
The conflict affected liberation movements across Africa, with some being 
supported by the Soviets, and some by the Chinese.  The South African Communist 
Party had strong links with the Soviet Union172, and applied pressure on the African 
National Congress to side with Moscow.  Beijing opted to support the Pan Africanist 
Congress, but was not able to provide the same level of support that the Soviets 
provided to the ANC.173 It was not finite resources alone that prevented China from 
becoming a stronger liberation partner of the PAC in South Africa; it was a lukewarm 
commitment all round.  China during the 1960s and through to the 1980s developed a 
lucrative and clandestine trade relationship with South Africa’s apartheid government.  
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This was in addition to the official diplomatic relations that South Africa had with the 
Republic of China.  China maintained its official line of opposing the National Party 
government and no official government to government relations ever existed.  Both the 
ANC as well as the PAC were aware of the trade with the result being an at times tense 
relationship.174   
Of course, all of this is now forgotten because it is not a very usable history for 
relations between China and South Africa.  Soon after the unbanning of the ANC in 
1990, a move was made to strengthen relations with China.  Nelson Mandela in a 
speech to at a conference of Umkhonto we Sizwe in 1991, specifically thanked China 
for its support and assistance in the liberation movement.175  In 1992176 Mandela made 
his first visit to China, where he was greeted with great aplomb by the Chinese 
leadership.  It is this visit that was the real beginning of the present relationship between 
South Africa and China.  The visit was strategic for both China and the ANC.  China 
was eager to find new friends after experiencing three years of international isolation 
and condemnation following the Tiananmen Square massacre.  Being seen with the 
world’s most recognized and beloved liberation leader boosted China’s battered image.  
China was also playing catch up after having not paid much attention to the ANC.  
South Africa was just two years away from its first democratic election, and it was clear 
that the ANC would play a significant role in the new government – the government of 
                                                 
174 Whytock, Ian A. "Spitting into the Wind: Communist China and South African Trade and Foreign 
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175 Mandela, Nelson. "Address of Comrade President Nelson Mandela to the Conference of Umkhonto 
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the most wealthy and powerful nation in Africa. For the ANC, the strategic interests lay 
in diversifying its international relations.  China was a rising power that significantly was 
not from the West.  The ANC was also still reeling from the dramatic collapse of the 
Soviet Union just a year earlier, and the loss of a key ally.   
 
In this next section we will examine China’s international identities and will 
attempt to see how China and South Africa have moved beyond the current events of 
the day in pushing their ties, and have instead begun relating to each other through a 
common international identity. 
 
3.6.1 China’s International Identities 
China, more than any power in the world, possesses a number of competing 
international identities. Consequently, China’s foreign policy often exhibits a conflicting 
range of orientations. David Shambaugh, in his book China Goes Global: the Partial 
Power177, identifies seven main international identities exhibited in China’s foreign policy 
discourse and debates.  The diagram below represents the identities in extremes with 
China’s Nativists, or isolationists being the one extreme and the Globalist, or 




	 	 	 	 	 							First																		South													Multilateralism	
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For the purposes of our study, these differences in China’s global identity are important 
since they also represent the diversity in which China projects its identity in its 
diplomatic relations.  China’s relations with South Africa have almost exclusively 
involved the projection of its Global South international identity.  Shambaugh identifies 
historical experience and an emphasis on China’s developing economy status as 
distinguishing features from China’s other global identities.  “They [Global South 
identifiers] argue that given China’s historical experience with colonialism and 
imperialism, and as a developing country, its main international identity and 
responsibility lies with the developing world.”178  China’s dramatic economic growth over 
the last two decades has put it in a very different class from most emerging economies 
after becoming the world’s second largest economy in 2009.  Nevertheless, proponents 
of the Global South identity see it as an imperative to identify and align with the 
developing world, especially for diplomatic support to help fend off the West on issues 
such as Tibet, human rights, Taiwan, climate change, and so on.179  Not surprisingly, it 
is this group that has actively advocated and advanced the ideals of the BRICS (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, South Africa) political bloc.  
 
Just like South Africa, China makes use of the Bandung conference as a 
historical tool in its diplomacy with South Africa.180   South Africa sent three delegates 
from the African National Congress and the South African Indian Congress to the 
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conference.  Included in this delegation was Moses Kotane, secretary general of the 
South African Communist Party  and who, ten years later, headed the African National 
Congress office in Dar es Salaam.181  Despite the credentials of the South African 
delegates, there is no evidence that official contact was made by the small delegation 
towards China at Bandung.   
 
China’s Ambassador to South Africa, H.E. Tian Xuejun, in an address to the 
South African Institute of International Affairs in 2012, elaborated on the driving forces 
behind China’s relationship with Africa.  His comments highlighted the technique of 
using history as a diplomatic tool, as well as in employing China’s Global South identity 
in its relations with South Africa: 
The China-Africa relationship is a centuries-old journey.  China and Africa 
were in contact with each other as early as in about the 2nd century B.C. 
and direct marine trade started in the 1st century A.D.  Chinese navigator 
Zheng He of the 15th century led fleets to the eastern coast of Africa, 
visiting places in what is today Somalia, Kenya and Mozambique.  Instead 
of establishing colonies or  engaging in slave trade like western colonists 
of the time, Zheng He traded goods with local people and introduced the 
Chinese culture182.   
 
Ambassador Xuejun’s comments reflected those of both President Thabo Mbeki and 
President Jacob Zuma, focusing on distinguishing China’s interactions with the 
continent from those of the West, as well as highlighting the historical continuities in 
China’s relations with Africa.  Again, the history that is drawn on or invoked is self-
consciously ancient history, separated by centuries from the present governments.   
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Xuejun then went on to express solidarity with Africans and specifically the 
support that his country had shown to Africa in its struggle for independence from 
colonialism:  
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese 
government and people have firmly stood with the African people in your 
fight for national independence, and in your endeavour pursuing national 
development.  African countries have also rendered China precious 
support on the restoration of our legitimate seat in the United Nations and 
many other important issues concerning China’s core interest.183 
 
In veiled terms, Xuejun thanked South Africa and the continent for its support in “issues 
concerning China’s core interests.” This was almost certainly referring to China’s ‘One 
China’ policy, which has been an important element of the Chinese-South Africa 
relationship.184  In the Joint Communique signed on January 1, 1998, establishing 
diplomatic relations between China and South Africa, one of the four articles stipulated 
South Africa’s recognition of but “one China”.  The article reads: 
The Government of the Republic of South Africa recognizes that there is 
but one China in the world, the Government of the People's Republic of 
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China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China and 
recognizes China's position that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.185 
 
The article reveals the strategic nature of South Africa and China’s relationship.  They 
are not simply bound by “historical solidarity”, but rather the constraints and needs of 
their respective states---in short, the essence of realpolitik.  This realism underscores 
another fact addressed in this chapter, that history is but a tool in diplomacy, and this 
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Policy Transitions: A Case Study of the Nationalization Debate 
 
“The nationalization of the mines, banks and monopoly industries is the policy of the 
ANC” –Nelson Mandela186 
 
“In our [ANC] economic policies…there is not a single reference to things like 










                                                 
186 Mandela, Nelson, “We will nationalize”, statement 26 January 1990. Web. http://mg.co.za/article/1990-
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4.1  Introduction 
Economic nationalization has been an enduring debate in South Africa from the 
time of the National Party’s ascendancy. The debate has had its ebbs and flows, often 
in tandem with global economic trends. Each reappearance of the debate centers on 
the role of the state in the economy.  Is the government to be a referee in the nation’s 
economy, or is it to be the main engine through ownership of key industries and 
corporations?  This chapter begins by way of a brief examination of what nationalization 
looked like during apartheid.  This is followed by a study of the ANC’s stance towards 
nationalization up until the 1994 elections.  The focus will be the international influence 
and the context of the international environment in shaping the ANC’s economic 
policies.  Finally, the chapter will conclude with the re-emergence of the debate in the 
second decade of the 21st century and how the international environment shaped this 
debate, and especially with regard to China.   
 
4.2  Nationalization under the National Party 
Merle Lipton, author of Capitalism and Apartheid: South Africa, 1910-1986, noted 
that intimately bound to Afrikaner nationalists was the economic struggle for the 
Afrikaner people.188  The nationalists even called the goal to conquer the cities and to 
dominate the economy as the “second great trek”.189  Tim Cohen examined the 
principles adopted by the Afrikaner organization the Broederbond in 1940 for examples 
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of nationalization.  The Broderbond economic policy included “abolition of the 
exploitation by foreigners of the national resources” and “the nationalization of finance 
and planned coordination of economic policy.”190  One economic institution created by 
the Broederbond which exemplified their commitment to Afrikaner capital was the 
Volkskas Koöperatief Beperk, founded in 1934.  The bank was committed to abolishing 
foreign capital, but above all to the uplifting of Afrikaners out of poverty.  The bottom line 
for Afrikaners of this period was their perceived need for ethnic survival, and all policies 
including economic served this notion.191 
The opinion of Dr Nico Diederichs is useful to quote, who wrote a 1941 book, Die 
Republikeinse Volkstaat van die Toekoms, and contained his idea of the role of the 
state in the economy: 
Critically, the State will have to exercise strong oversight over the businesses 
within its territory that are controlled by citizens of foreign states.  All key 
industries, including the mines, must be placed under State control, in order to 
ensure that they provide the greatest possible service to the community and 
general national interest and [are] not just purely focused on achieving the 
highest level of profit possible.  A state bank should be established to ensure that 
it has a purely indigenous character and that the capital and credit of the State is 
controlled in the interests of the community.192    
 
Though Diederichs was considered to have been on the fringes of the Nationalist Party 
before the Second World War, he would serve as Minister of Economic Affairs between 
1958 and 1967, where his opinions became more tempered. 
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World War II dramatically changed the economic landscape in South Africa and 
almost eliminated talk of economic nationalization, as white nationalists benefited from 
the war industries.  Lipton described the opportunities provided by the war, noting, 
“white unemployment, endemic since Union, was practically eliminated by the 
manpower needs of the armed forces and the war industries.  White farms gained from 
high food prices.”193 Nonetheless, while the war moderated talk of nationalization, the 
urge for state intervention and state-led development in the economy was not quashed.  
This was evidenced by the state-led investments in key infrastructures such as the silos 
that supported commercial agriculture and agro-processing, the rail infrastructure that 
facilitated the movement of goods in mining and agriculture, and investments in 
technology in selected sectors.    
As we will see in our next section, these actions and policies inspired the ANC 
and formed part of its own justifications for state intervention. 
 
4.3  The ANC and Nationalization  
The issue of nationalization has a fraught history within the ranks of the ANC.194  
Shortly before Mandela’s release from Robben Island, he issued a brief statement on 
ANC economic policy: 
[t]he nationalization of the mines, banks and monopoly industries is the policy of 
the ANC, and a change or modification of our views in this regard is 
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inconceivable.  Black economic empowerment is a goal we fully support and 
encourage, but in our situation state control of certain sectors of the economy is 
unavoidable.195 
 
Mandela’s statement was consistent with a similar statement he had made at his 1964 
trial where he outlined the ANC policy of nationalizing mines, banks and monopolies 
that were held by one race only.  The goal was not just political emancipation; it was 
economic emancipation as well.  Mandela pointed out that this economic policy goal 
was similar to what the Nationalists had in mind,  “The ANC’s policy corresponds with 
the old policy of the present Nationalist Party which, for many years, had as part of its 
programme the nationalization of the gold mines.”196  After being interviewed in 1990 by 
veteran journalist, Allister Sparks, on the logic behind nationalization, Mandela once 
again used the example of the Nationalist Party.  The apparent success of the 
Nationalists in lifting poor Afrikaners out of poverty through state directed economic 
policies and intervention could be replicated in the new era, Mandela reasoned, only 
this time for poor black South Africans.197  Mandela’s statements on nationalization 
were not stand alone policy, but an interpretation of the Freedom Charter adopted by 
the Congress of the People in 1955, which contained a section on redistribution and 
transfer of wealth.  The section reads: 
The national wealth of our country, the heritage of South Africans, shall be 
restored to the people; 
The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the Banks and monopoly industry shall be  
 transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole; 
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All other industry and trade shall be controlled to assist the wellbeing of the 
people;198 
 
This section of the Charter has been particularly contentious and has been used both to 
support nationalization and to oppose it. Ben Turok, one of the authors of the economic 
clauses of the 1955 Charter, weighed in on nationalization in 2009, and what the 
authors of the Charter had intended saying, 
[what] was in our minds at the time was to emphasize that white economic power 
had usurped the historical legacy of the indigenous people whose ownership had 
to be restored. It was the colonial aspect that the charter sought to reverse, not 
private ownership of property.  It has never been the intention of the ANC to 
create a command economy by nationalization, either then or now.199 
 
One must also consider the context of the time in which Turok wrote the section.  In 
1955, industrial state led monopolies were common, even in Western countries like 
Britain and France, where the state played a large role in the rebuilding effort following 
the Second World War.200   
Mandela’s statements on nationalization reflect the historical legacy of the 
Freedom Charter, and also the way in which the ANC was influenced by the Nationalist 
Party. The world had changed drastically since 1955 though, and Mandela and the ANC 
at the start of 1990 were not sensitive to the shift in international economic thinking.  
They were still steeped in the Soviet thinking of a command economy, even as the 
Soviet Union was in the throes of collapse.  In Chapter Two, we saw that with the 
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collapse of communism in Europe and the Soviet Union, a “new world order” was 
heralded.  This order accepted liberal democracy to now be the international norm.  
Leaders of this world order did not just celebrate the triumph of liberal democracy over 
communism; for them, it was as also a victory of capitalism over the command 
economy.  The new economic thinking was epitomized by the phrase “Washington 
Consensus”.  Originally coined by American economist John Williamson in 1990, the 
term summarized ten policy recommendations for the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury Department.  The policies were for aiding 
market reforms in developing countries and covered market liberalization, trade 
liberalization, and privatization of state enterprises.  The term became more broadly 
understood as the marriage of liberal democracy with free market principles that 
Washington espoused in the “new world order”.201  It also became interchangeable to 
some degree with the term neoliberalism, which, in the context of the 1990s, refers to 
economic liberalization policies such as the ones suggested by Williamson.202  The 
“consensus” of market fundamentalism and of neoliberalism became a self-fulfilling 
doctrine, as those who advocated it also drew on its increasingly global hegemonic 
characteristics. As Adam Habib described this: 
The principal ideological resources available to actors’ advocating a neo-liberal 
economic programme was the rise to hegemony of market ideology.  This 
resulted from the collapse of the communist bloc in Eastern Europe and the 
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Soviet Union.  This collapse of communism ensured that there was no alternative 
economic discourse to that of the market.203 
 
The Nationalist Party were ahead of the ANC when it came to reading the international 
climate, and had already identified the global shift towards free-market thinking.  The 
starting point for this evolution had already begun in 1987 with a government publication 
entitled White Paper on Privatization and Deregulation in the Republic of South 
Africa.204   In 1988, the government went from theory to action when President P.W. 
Botha announced the privatization of several state-controlled industries, and in 
November 1989, Iscor was sold for R3 billion.  There were domestic concerns that 
weighed on the privatization programme, such as the government’s dire need for 
capital, but also weighing on the decision was the adoption of purer free market 
principles.  
The economic section of President de Klerk’s opening address to parliament in 
1990 could have been taken almost directly from Williamson’s 1990 paper, except 
Williamson would not publish the paper until three months after de Klerk’s speech.  De 
Klerk’s speech touched on tax reform, foreign exchange, trader liberalization, fiscal 
reform, and inflation reduction, all points in Williamson’s paper highlighting a global 
“consensus” emerging on economic policy.  The section also reaffirmed that de Klerk’s 
government was committed to the economic reform process begun under the Botha 
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administration.  Most critically, de Klerk outlined a new role for the state in South 
Africa’s economy with a complete rejection of the statist economy:   
[t]he Government's basic point of departure is to reduce the role of the public 
sector in the economy and to give the private sector maximum opportunity for 
optimal performance. In this process, preference has to be given to allowing the 
market forces and a sound competitive structure to bring about the necessary 
adjustments.205 
 
Mandela’s statement on nationalization, just days prior to de Klerk’s speech, was a 
study in contrast.  Mandela envisioned a larger role for the state in the economy, while 
de Klerk was making plans on reducing its size and scope.  Yet, just four years later and 
two days after the national elections that swept the ANC to power, Mandela would 
declare that “In our [ANC] economic policies…there is not a single reference to things 
like nationalization, and this is not accidental.  There is not a single slogan that will 
connect us with any Marxist ideology.”206  How did this radical transformation come 
about?  What influenced the change in Mandela’s thinking?  Several studies have been 
devoted to studying the underlying causes for the transition from nationalist economic 
policy to a free market policy.  Patrick Bond, in Elite Transition: From Apartheid to 
Neoliberalism approaches the question through a Marxist class structure, and focuses 
on what he calls the “elite pacting” that took place between the ANC and the 
transnational elites.207  As the ANC prepared itself for government in the time leading up 
to the 1994 election, it underwent a “steep forgetting curve” as it was introduced to the 
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new economic orthodoxy by the global elites.208  Bond critically examines the way in 
which the ANC elite were absorbed into the governing structure of both South Africa 
and internationally, by their acceptance of this ‘consensus’.  In contrast to Bond’s class 
approach, Hein Marais’s book South Africa Pushed to the Limit: The Political Economy 
of Change, focuses on the historical underpinnings of South Africa’s economic transition 
from the National Party to the ANC.209  The book is a sweeping historical study of South 
Africa’s post-apartheid economic policies, but includes an important chapter on the 
evolution of the ANC’s economic policy from 1990 to 1994.  Marais identifies the ANC’s 
lack of experience in economic policy making as a contributing factor to the 
organization’s muddled policy stance.210  The ANC was aware of this hole, and gave up 
the position of Finance Minister in the initial Government of National Unity. In a June 
1994 meeting convened by Mandela for the appointment of a new Finance Minister after 
Derek Keys’ resignation, Mandela cautioned those present, advising, “I don’t think we 
are ready yet for an ANC appointment.”211  Instead, political outsider ,Chris Liebenberg, 
was appointed.   
Another element that played a decisive role in the ANC’s change of thinking was 
the influence and pressure of the international community; it is this element that is most 
pertinent to our study.  The ANC came under immediate pressure after its unbanning 
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over its nationalization policy.  Threats, ridicule, and badgering came from all corners, 
but especially from Western governments.  Mandela and the ANC quickly adopted and 
went on an international charm offensive.  In December 1991, Mandela embarked on a 
tour of America to build support for their position in the negotiations.  An important 
aspect of the trip was assuring American investors that South Africa was open for 
business. Unsurprisingly, American investors were nervous after the initial ANC call for 
nationalization.  Mandela spoke to a crowd of 200 American CEO’s in Pittsburgh to 
reassure them that the ANC was not an enemy of private enterprise:   
[t]he private sector must and will play the central and decisive role in the struggle 
to achieve many of [the transformation] objectives […] let me assure you that the 
ANC is not an enemy of private enterprise […] We are determined to create the 
necessary climate which the foreign investor will find attractive.  Let me further 
make the point that the ANC has no ideological commitment to nationalization. 
[…]What we visualize is a mixed economy which, led by the private sector, will 
include a public sector, small business and cooperatives.212 
 
So, Mandela did not completely reject nationalization, it was only that the ANC was not 
ideologically committed to it.  Mandela’s speech in Pittsburgh however, marked the 
beginning of a shift that would continue over the course of 1991, as the ANC leadership 
started projecting more moderate, business-friendly policies.  Senior ANC leaders 
cultivated close relationships with top South African businessmen.  Patti Waldmeir wrote 
of Mandela’s business ties, noting, “he constantly sought the views of international 
businessmen and bankers on South Africa’s future. […] and dined regularly with Anglo 
patriarch Harry Oppenheimer.”213  This relationship with capital was described by 
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Sampie Terreblanche, who wrote that South Africa’s business elite exerted pressure on 
ANC economic thinking in part because of U.S. pressure on themselves.214 
The last stand for nationalization would come in February 1992 at the World 
Economic Forum, in Davos, Switzerland.  South Africa was represented at the forum by 
Mandela, de Klerk and Inkatha Freedom Party leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Davos 
was an opportunity for the leaders to present themselves to world and business leaders 
alike.  Mandela began the conference by defending the ANC’s intention to use state-
owned industry to rebuild the economy, just as Britain, Germany and Japan had done in 
the post war years.  Reportedly, the Dutch Minister of Industry remarked wryly to 
Mandela that this was a different economic era with interdependent economies.215  
Even China and Vietnam weighed in, and told Mandela that they had accepted private 
enterprise, especially in light of what had happened in the Soviet Union.216 Pippa Green 
gives an account of how Mandela had been encouraged to attend Davos by Tito 
Mboweni, director of the ANC’s Economics Department, in order to quell Western fears 
that the ANC was a radical organization.217  When Mboweni arrived at Davos, he found 
that the speech Mandela was to deliver had already been distributed to the media, and 
that the economic section had been filled in by one of the left-wing ANC economists 
from London.  The prepared speech dealt with the nationalization issue, declaring, 
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“Nationalization in our view does not mean a universal blanket policy or sticking rigidly 
to an old dogma.  It means examining selected major enterprises on a case by case 
basis beginning with corporations already in state hands.”218  Mboweni understood that 
the international consensus on economic policy had shifted and that international 
support for the negotiations could be gained by conforming to the new dispensation.  He 
counselled Mandela not to proceed with the speech, insisting that “You can’t deliver this 
speech here…you can’t go in front of thousands of business executives and talk about 
nationalization…We’ve moved on.  We now talk about a mixed economy...[t]hese 
people consider you a hero, don’t disappoint them.”219   
The Chinese took a particular interest in the ANC’s economic position, and 
Chinese Premier Li Peng, questioned Mandela on why he was pursuing a 
nationalization policy.  He said “Madiba, I don’t understand why you’re talking about 
nationalization.  You’re not even a communist party.  I am a leader of a communist party 
in China, and I’m talking privatization.”220  The conversation left an indelible impact on 
Mandela, and, according to Mboweni, he would reference the Li Peng remarks  during 
every ANC discussion on the economy.  Mboweni quotes Mandela as saying, “Even Li 
Peng, general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party doesn’t believe in 
nationalization.  Who are we?  We are not a communist party.”221   
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Mandela was convinced, and that night struck out the prepared passage on 
nationalization and instead substituted one that described an ANC policy of a mixed 
economy where the private sector would play a central and critical role in creating 
wealth and jobs.  After the meetings at Davos were concluded, Mandela visited 
Copenhagen where he made similar statements. Upon returning home to South Africa, 
he summoned a meeting of ANC leaders to share with them his change in thinking:  
"chaps we have to choose. We either keep nationalization and get no investment, or we 
modify our attitude and get investment."222  William Gumede notes that the reaction 
from the leadership was an emphatic rejection, with some accusing Mandela of 
betraying the Freedom Charter.223  The die had been cast though, and in the lead up to 
the 1994 election, the majority within the ANC leadership would fall in line behind 
Mandela.  The international environment played a role in this organizational shift, and in 
particular the United States. The U.S. focused a considerable amount of help and 
money into developing a cadre of ANC economic thinkers and leaders.  Some of the 
ANC economists were sent to the U.S. for training, including Tito Mboweni, who was 
supported for several visits, including one to attend a special program on antitrust.  U.S. 
Ambassador to South Africa, Princeton Lyman, recalls Mboweni as a convert to free 
market policies after his visits, saying “Mboweni, who had been a longtime supporter of 
nationalization of key industries, became over time a champion of antitrust polices 
instead.”224  In addition to these foreign educational opportunities, the U.S. coordinated 
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conferences and training seminars in South Africa.  In the fall of 1992, a group of private 
American companies, along with the U.S. government, put together a series of 
economic models that came to be known as the Mt. Fleur scenarios.  Each model was 
given a bird name, with the “ideal model” being the “flamingo” as Lyman put it.  Lyman 
described the model, depicting it as, “the flamingo contained a combination of controlled 
deficits, promotion of private investment, and select improvements in key social 
sectors.”225  The presence of key ANC economic leaders at the Mt. Fleur meetings was 
taken as a positive indication by the U.S. government on the direction of ANC policy.  
The ANC was also courted by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
during this period, with several ANC officials being sent to the World Bank for a 
familiarization course.  Ian Taylor describes the interaction between the ANC and the 
powerful financial institutions:  
[t]hroughout the transition period, the ANC leadership came under relentless 
pressure from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to abandon 
its proposed inward investment programme in favour of a more ‘realistic’ 
investment-led, export-oriented growth strategy.226 
 
 In 1993, the Transitional Executive Committee (TEC) composed of 8 National 
Party leaders and 8 ANC leaders requested a $850 million from the IMF.  The IMF 
condition for giving the loan was that all 16 members of the TEC sign a “Statement on 
Economic Policy”.  The document institutionalized the policy recommendations that the 
IMF had been making to the ANC of market liberalization, open investment, and free 
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trade.  All 16 TEC members signed the document.227  Looking back, Ronnie Kasrils 
refers to the signing of the document as the ANC’s “faustian moment”.228  The 
nationalization debate, for the time being, had been banished to the fringes of the ANC, 
and the free market mantra of the “Washington Consensus” was adopted.  In our next 
section, we will see that this would not last for long.   
 
4.4  The ANC and Nationalization…Again 
 The nationalization debate resurfaced on the national political debate once more 
in 2008.  This time, the movement was led by a young firebrand ANC Youth League 
President named Julius Malema.  It had been fourteen years since the ANC was swept 
to power, and there was growing dissatisfaction with the state of the economy, both 
within ANC ranks and in the country’s townships; youth unemployment was still 
extremely prevalent, and the divide between rich and poor was largely race based 
despite the efforts of Black Economic Empowerment policies.  Tim Cohen cites some of 
these domestic factors in bringing back the nationalization debate, but he also 
contextualizes it internationally.229  The 2007 economic crash in the U.S. property and 
debt markets had spread to the banks of Europe by 2008.  As the Western economies 
began to slow, and in many cases contract, the effects were acutely felt in emerging 
markets such as South Africa.  Cohen theorizes that as the international economy 
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weakened and with it the consensus on neoliberal economic policy, nationalization 
surfaced.  This was simply part of the cycle of history.  In Cohen’s words: 
[i]t occurred to me that nationalization and privatization take place in 
contradictory waves through economic history, ebbing and flowing as the 
economic cycle turns.  The year 2008 was definitely an ‘ebb’ year for privatization 
and a ‘flow’ year for nationalization internationally.230 
 
Cohen points out that the historic cycle was domestic too, drawing comparisons 
between Malema and the National Party’s Dr. Nico Diederichs, from 70 years earlier.231  
 As the old model of neoliberalism began to be questioned in earnest following the 
crisis, it was not replaced with outright nationalization. Instead, a hybrid model, mixing 
elements of the state with capitalism began to emerge.  China had been developing an 
alternative economic model ever since the market reforms of the mid-1990s.  In a 2004 
paper, Joshua Ramo published a paper titled The Beijing Consensus.232   A tongue-in-
cheek reference to the “Washington Consensus”, Ramo was the first to identify that 
China had developed a unique development model, but he provided little detail of what 
this model looked like, in part because there was no ‘Chinese model’ per se.  The 
Economist defined state capitalism as states that provide financial and political backing 
to corporations and State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and who then competed in 
international markets.  The champion of this model?  China.233  The financial crisis 
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provided the ‘break out moment’ for the Chinese model, as China’s economy, led by a 
powerful state, continued to grow at breakneck speed through the international financial 
downturn.  American political analyst Ian Bremmer in 2009 declared that “state 
capitalism had come of age”.234  Bremmer described the end of the free market wave of 
the 1990s and the characteristics of state capitalism: 
[the] free-market tide has now receded. In its place has come state capitalism, a 
system in which the state functions as the leading economic actor and uses 
markets primarily for political gain. This trend has stoked a new global 
competition, not between rival political ideologies but between competing 
economic models.235  
 
Put simply, the state was back, and no longer was it generally accepted that it should 
play a minor role in a country’s economy.  The success of China in using the state for 
development was described by The Economist:  
With the West in a funk and emerging markets flourishing, the Chinese no longer 
see state-directed firms as a way-station on the road to liberal capitalism; rather, 
they see it as a sustainable model. They think they have redesigned capitalism to 
make it work better, and a growing number of emerging-world leaders agree with 
them.236 
 
 South Africa was among that group of world leaders who were interested in what 
the Chinese were doing.  After a protracted debate on nationalization, the ANC officially 
rejected the policy in 2012, but declared a larger role for the state and an expansion of 
State Owned Enterprises.237 President Jacob Zuma’s State of the Nation Address in the 
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same year called for mass scale state spending on infrastructure projects to stimulate 
the economy.  Many within the media labelled the move as South Africa’s “Chinese 
Moment”.238  The label was premature and simplistic, but there was no denying that 
South Africa was inspired by the accomplishments of the Chinese.  Since the beginning 
of official relations in 1998, South African diplomatic and commercial ties had 
strengthened dramatically.  As the climate shifted both globally and domestically for the 
role of the state in the economy, South Africa began to study China.  Enoch 
Godongwana, head of the ANC’s economic transformation committee, even spoke of an 
exact replication of the Chinese model,  “the Chinese model of building infrastructure 
and growing jobs will be a key focus of the ANC’s economic policy”239  Public 
Enterprises Minister, Malusi Gigaba, during a 2012 interview outlined the role of the 
state in the Chinese model, saying, “they [the Chinese] reached the level of 
development because the state played an active part in the economy. It didn’t sit back 
and say to the private sector that all we do is establish regulation.”240  Gigaba, along 
with Economic Development Minister, Ebrahim Patel, visited China during 2011 with the 
purpose of studying Chinese SOEs’ and their role in strengthening the economy.  Their 
study trip followed a 2010 visit by 35 senior ANC members who were sent to Beijing for 
two weeks of “intensive political education” which included lectures on Chinese national 
planning and the Communist Party’s political education system.241  The visit fulfilled a 
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2009 ANC request that all members of its national executive committee take part in 
Chinese Communist Party lessons.  Very little is known about the lessons that the ANC 
received, but the subjects include governance, social planning, development 
economics, and state enterprise management.   
 President Zuma, more than any previous South African leader, has shown great 
interest in learning from the Chinese experience.  In a 2010 address at Renmin 
University in Beijing, Zuma criticized the Western hegemony of the old economic order, 
but wondered what the developing world could learn from China. 
[i]n the past, economists from the developed countries told the developing 
countries that they should behave more like the developed countries. […]The 
developing world was told that if it did not Westernize and change its political 
systems to mirror those of the West, they could forget about achieving economic 
growth and development. Now we are asking what we could learn from other 
political systems and cultures. Is the political discipline in China a recipe for 
economic success, for example?242 
 
The regular learning trips to Beijing have not been enough, and in August of 
2014, senior ANC leaders held a meeting with the Chinese Ambassador to South Africa 
to discuss the Chinese Communist Party financing the building of a political school in 
South Africa.  The school would be modelled after the Chinese Communist Party School 
in Beijing.243 
 There is an element of déjà vu in all of this.  Not even twenty years beforehand, 
the ANC had been jetting off to Washington and New York to learn from economists and 
politicians there about the latest thinking in economic development.  In terms of 
economic models and counsel, the role of the state has formed the common thread in 
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South Africa’s relationship with the U.S. and with China.  History shows that the state 
will continue to feature prominently in debates and discussions on South Africa’s 
economy—another continuity between the “old” and “new” South Africa.  These future 
























This thesis set out to develop a broader understanding of transitions in South 
Africa.  Chapter Two sketched the global context to South Africa’s political 
transition.  South Africa’s transition to democracy was not an isolated domestic event, 
but was shaped and influenced by the seismic shifts taking place in the international 
order.  By employing a global historic perspective, the chapter came to a more nuanced 
understanding of the interplay between the global transition and South Africa’s political 
transition.  This international dimension to the shaping of South African politics was not 
new.  Speaking of this force, Helen Suzman concluded, “the government in power in the 
days of Verwoerd and Vorster frankly didn’t give a damn…but don’t forget the impact of 
the outside, it was there.”244  This “impact of the outside” exemplifies a striking continuity 
between the “old” and “new” South Africa. 
 
            Chapter Three, the most in-depth of the three transition themes, examined the 
role of history in South Africa’s politics and in particular its role in crafting an 
international historic identity.  The chapter showed that the politicization of history in 
South Africa has extended to the foreign policy realm as well, where South African 
leaders and foreign policy practitioners use history as a diplomatic tool. This was shown 
through a consideration of history as ‘usable’ history in South Africa’s relations with the 
U.S. and with China.  
 
Finally, the study concluded with a case study of the nationalization debates in 
South Africa as an example of the policy transitions that accompanied South Africa’s 
political transition.  There have been three waves of debate, at the heart of which was 
the role of the state in the economy.  A complete history of the nationalization debates 
was not possible, nor required for the goals of this thesis.  Instead, the context focus 
was on the shaping role and influence that the U.S. and Chinese had in the debate over 
the role of the state.  This subject is rich in potential for future research – 
specifically, the internal debate within the ANC in the early 1990s over the adoption of a 
neoliberal economic policy.  Details are slowly emerging that a free market economic 
                                                 
244 Lyman, Princeton N. Partner to History: The U.S. Role in South Africa's Transition to Democracy. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2002.  45. Print. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
104 
 
policy was adopted by the ANC leadership despite vehement opposition. On the 
outside, it appeared that consensus had been built within the organization from 1990 to 
1994, but in reality the leadership may have ‘steamrolled’ the policy adoption 
process. Ronnie Kasrils is one of the very first ANC senior leaders to have criticized this 
process and Mandela’s handling of it, arguing that “attempts within the ANC to critique 
neoliberal policies were imperiously put down by Mandela, who firmly believed the 
opposite and by then was used to getting his way”.245 
 
The study of South African foreign relations with the U.S. or China is complex on 
its own, without the consideration of nationalization, international historic identity, and 
global context.  This thesis has sought to come to terms with the challenges of studying 
broad and expansive subjects by focusing on the theme of transition, thereby 
demonstrating the benefits of using a global historic framework for studying South 
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